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 PREFACE AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Company cars are defined as passenger light-duty vehicles, which companies lease or own 
and which employees use for their personal and business travel
1. They account for roughly 50 
percent of all new sales of cars in EU. Cars have a central importance both as a creator of 
mobility but also as a source of adverse environmental impact such as CO2 emissions, noise, 
particles, congestion problems etc. 
 
This study reviews the extent to which the current taxation of company cars artificially 
promotes the use of such cars beyond its underlying merits. The key question is whether the 
employees by way of the free use of such cars receive benefits that are under-taxed relative to 
alternative salary remuneration. A favourable tax treatment of company cars is distorting and 
imposes a welfare cost to the society. It encourages car ownership and affects the choice of 
car model, as well as driving habits, and in this way aggravates the environmental problems 
caused by the transport sector. In fact, evidence from Belgium and the Netherlands suggests 
that pure business use represents only 20-30 percent of company car use
2, the rest being 
private use. 
 
This study presents new, nearly EU wide estimates of the level of subsidies to company cars. 
In addition it also provides some preliminary rough illustrations of the possible effects of such 
subsidies on economic welfare and environment and discuses the policy implications.  
 
The main conclusions are: 
  Under-taxation of company cars is largely the norm within EU, though with 
substantial variations as outlined in chapter 2. 
  Direct revenue losses may approach ½ percent of EU GDP (€54 billion) and welfare 
losses from distortions of consumer choice are substantial, perhaps equal to 0.1 to 0.3 
percent of GDP (€12 billion to €37 billion) as explained in chapter 3. 
  CO2 emissions are boosted by incentives to buy fuel and larger cars  
  More neutral taxation of company cars, i.e. higher taxation of employee benefits, 
could... 
  ... enhance welfare... 
  ... and reduce adverse environmental impacts in line with national and EU objectives 
in the areas of climate and energy policy:  
  Consequently, Member States should urgently look whether their company car tax 
facilities can be better aligned with their general policy objectives on economic 
efficiency, the environment and equity, and more specifically on their greenhouse gas 
reduction targets.  
  This study hopes to start such a discussion with a brief sketch of options for policy 
reforms  
 
                                                 
1 DSF (2005) 
2 Measured as percentage of total company car annual mileage or the number of trips, cf. also Table 2.1. 
  2Chapter 1  MAIN FINDINGS 
 
To evaluate the impact of company car taxation from the environmental and welfare 
perspectives we have divided the study into three main parts asking the following questions: 
 
•  Is the private use of company cars subsidised in EU Member States? 
•  What effect do such subsidies have on the composition and size of the EU car fleet, as 
well as the total amount of car travelling, and hence also on the environment and general 
welfare? 
•  Which options do Member States and the EU have at their disposal for (potentially) 
reforming the taxation of company cars? 
 
We summarise the findings regarding these three questions below. 
1.1.  MEASUREMENT OF SUBSIDIES FOR COMPANY-OWNED CARS  
Concepts of tax neutrality 
To measure the size of potential subsidies, we first develop the concept of tax neutrality: 
company car taxation is deemed to be neutral if the employees’ net disposable income 
position is the same whether a given level of total compensation from the employer side is 
provided as a cash remuneration or as fringe benefits in the form a company car also for 
private use.  
 
We provide two alternative versions of such tax neutrality. In the first definition, tax rules are 
deemed neutral if the actual costs incurred by the employer in providing the company car lead 
to a corresponding increase in the imputed taxable income for the employee using the car. We 
call this the firm cost principle. Such costs include four types of costs namely (1) financial 
costs associated with the purchase of the car such as interest charges, (2) the depreciation of 
the value of the car in the period where the car is owned by the company and (3) maintenance 
costs (e.g. insurance and repair work) and (4) fuel costs. 
 
In the second definition, tax rules are deemed neutral if the imputed taxable income for the 
employees equals the costs the employee would have incurred with a personal ownership of 
the car. We call this the opportunity cost principle. Using the opportunity cost principle will 
most often lead to a higher taxable income than with a firm cost approach as the employer has 
some advantages vis-à-vis the employee in buying, financing and maintaining cars. That 
includes larger discounts from dealers and lower interest rates from banks. 
 
Taxation of company cars in practice 
Before discussing how company cars could or should be taxed, it is worth recapitulating the 
various ways in which a company car could in principle be under taxed relative to other 
business assets with the same productive function: 
 
  Company level 
o  Favourable depreciation rules for company car relative to other assets with 
same economic life providing up front liquidity gains 
o  The company may deduct the car purchase and subsequent repair purchases for 
VAT purposes while the employee does not pay VAT on the use of the car 
  3   Low imputed value for the employee for use of the company car 
o  The firm incurs cost in terms of (1) financing the original purchase (2) 
realising a loss when selling it and typically (3) paying repair and maintenance.  
o  The firm may choose to lease a car rather than to own it: it will provide fees to 
the leasing company equal to these costs. 
o  The employee may be under-taxed relative to the cost of providing this service 
irrespective of whether the car is owned or leased by the firm 
o  Free provision of fuel for private use is typically not taxed 
  Tax treatment at the employee side 
o  Imputed car benefits may not be subjected to employer or employee social 
security contributions but ‘only’ pure wage taxation 
 
When designing systems for taxation of company cars, tax authorities need to decide on two 
key parameters. These are linked first to the issue of having tax systems that work in practice; 
and second to more principal issues such as choosing a benchmark for evaluating a neutral 
level of taxation, including the choice between the firm and the opportunity cost principle.  
 
Concerning the first issue, the practicability of tax systems, unless the system is to be highly 
complicated and cumbersome to operate, the rules for imputing the tax value of company car 
benefits must be based upon simple parameters applicable to all firms, employees and cars. 
The actual marginal financing cost for any particular firm is not known with certainty. Hence 
when calculating the value for the employee of the firm taking a loan to finance a car, tax 
authorities will have to base the imputed value on some average financing costs for either 
firms (‘firm cost principle’) or the employee (‘opportunity cost principle’). Depreciation rates 
also differ among car makes and attempts to further distinguish between private individuals 
and companies would require more complicated systems.  
 
Hence, in practice taxation rules have a relatively simple structure. As a proxy for the total 
level of finance, depreciation and maintenance costs, Member States impute a taxable income 
which is a fixed percent of the car price. Some countries – for example Austria, France, 
Ireland and Portugal – use the actual purchase cost for the company as a base, while others – 
for example Denmark, the Netherlands and UK – use the list price for the car. Selection of the 
former base could be seen as expressing a choice for the firm cost principle, while the latter as 
using an opportunity cost principle; acquisition costs for companies will always be either on 
par with or lower than list prices. The rates for imputing the tax base differ considerably 
across EU Member States, which indicate substantial variance in the effective taxation of 
company cars cf. Table 1.1. Only two countries allow the use of rates below 10 percent while 
another five countries have imputation rates above 21 percent. 
 
  4Table 1.1: Rates for imputing tax base levied as a percentage of company car value, per annum, as of 2008 
Tax rate  
(per year) 
Country 
0-10%  Ireland: 6% list or acquisition price if business mileage 62,000km < m < 70,000km p.a. 
Portugal: 9% of acquisition cost 
United Kingdom: 10% of list price when CO2 emissions are 120 g CO2 / km or below. 
11-20%  Austria: 18% of acquisition cost incl. VAT, max €7,200 per year 
Czech Republic: 12% of list price, min. €432 
Finland: 16.8% of replacement price + €3240 
France: 12% of acquisition cost (if private fuel paid by employer)  
Germany: 12% of list price 
Ireland: 18% if business mileage 32,000 < m <=40,000km, 12% if business mileage 48,000 < m 
<=56,000km  
Luxembourg: 18% of acquisition cost 
Spain: 20% of acquisition cost 
United Kingdom: 15% of list price if emissions between 121-139 g CO2/km, increasing by 1% for 
each 5g CO2/km above 139g CO2/km , up to 35% 
20-35%  France: 20% of acquisition cost 
Denmark: 25% of list price below €40,000 (min. €21,333), 20% of list price above   
 €40,000 
Ireland: 30% if business mileage <=24,000 km, 24% if business mileage 24,000 < m <= 32,000 km 
Italy: 30% of ‘average cost of use’ based on 15,000km annual mileage, determined according to fixed 
km-rates 
The Netherlands: 25% of list price 
Slovakia: 19 % of acquisition cost 
Slovenia: 20 % of acquisition cost 
Romania: A*B*C*(100-D)/100 where A=cylinder capacity, B=tax in euro/1 cc, C=correlation 
coefficient, D=reduction ratio depending on the depreciation of the motor car/motor vehicle 
United Kingdom: 15% of list price if emissions between 121-139 g CO2/km, increasing by 1% for 




Belgium: Schedule of fixed-km rates based on engine power and emissions, fixed mileage 5,000 km or 
7500km p.a. 
Estonia: € 1,536 p.a. (fixed tax) 
Hungary: lump-sum tax based on schedule of car values 
Poland: Leasing costs of comparable cars 
Sweden: 9% of car value according to schedule + 31.7% of base amount + 2.168% of car value 
according to schedule 
Greece: No tax on benefit-in-kind received 
Note:  No information is available for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. Some of the countries are mentioned more than once 
in the table. The reason for this is that they offer more than one set of rules for calculating the employee tax base. 
Source:  PWC (2006), PWC (2008) and Copenhagen Economics 
 
As regards fuel costs, only a handful of countries actually ask employees to account for the 
fuels received from employers for private use, but proxies are often used that can take 
different forms. The simplest and most often used is to have higher general imputed rates for 
company cars with a high level of private use.  
 
The conclusion under this first practical part is that it makes no sense to calculate the specific 
potential subsidy associated with the tax treatment of each separate part of the principal 
company car fringe benefits (financing costs, depreciation, maintenance and fuel costs) as tax 
authorities combine various benefit categories and use rules-of-thumb to arrive at a imputed 
taxable income. Hence, only an overall evaluation of the net subsidy is feasible and 
meaningful, and then only subject to a number of conditionalities discussed below. 
 
As regards the second issue of defining the proper neutral benchmarks, a rather pragmatic 
approach is also suggested. Rather than proposing either a firm or opportunity cost approach 
we have done a sensitivity analysis that shows the consequences for the calculation of 
subsidies using assumptions that lean either in the direction of firm costs or opportunity costs. 
For example, there are a range of possible discount rates that could be used to calculate the 
financing costs that firms or alternatively households face, when they are to finance a new car. 
They can be very high for example for a household with a weak credit history (or a firm on 
the brink of bankruptcy). Or it can be very low for example for a household (or firm) with 
excess liquidity. Therefore, the use of high discount rate, and hence high level of required 
  5imputed income related to financing costs, could then be said to represent an opportunity costs 
principle. 
 
The pragmatic approach is also linked to the fact that we have not tried to measure the 
specific (company) car market conditions in each Member States but rather have used some 
stylised facts within the EU, specifically on items such as financing costs, rates of 
depreciation, insurance and maintenance costs, etc. We have accounted for cross-country 
differences in fuel costs, however, as they differ considerably due to different tax rates on 
fuel. 
Structure of tax subsidies  
While our subsidy estimates are only approximate, they provide a picture of substantial 
overall net tax subsidies to the private use of company cars. 
 
A company car in the medium segment enjoys subsidies above 10 percent relative to its list 
price in 18 out of the 19 countries for which subsidy calculation was possible cf. Table 1.2. 
The subsidy estimate is calculated here as the difference between the tax-neutral tax base and 
the actual imputed tax base relative to the incurred costs at the firm level, i.e. using the firm 
cost principle.  
 
On the high end, there are countries where tax rules include a ceiling on the amount on the tax 
base, such as Austria. Greece provides the extreme example of a country where there is no 
personal income tax on the use of company car. On the other hand, in Poland where personal 
income taxes are levied on the benefit-in-kind whose value is set at the actual cost of leasing a 




Table 1.2: Subsidies to private use of company cars in 19 EU Member States, high mileage, p.a. Measured as the 
percentage gap in imputed tax base 
  Segment Small  Segment Medium  Segment Large 
Group A: Subsidy up to 10%   Finland, Poland  Poland  United Kingdom 
Group B: Subsidy 11%-20%  Denmark, Sweden  Denmark,  Finland,  France, 
Netherlands, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
Denmark, Finland, France, 
Netherlands, Poland, Sweden 




Czech R., Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain 
Group D: Subsidy more than 
30% 
Austria, Belgium, Czech R., 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, United Kingdom 
Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovakia 
Austria, Belgium, Greece, 
Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia,  
Note:  Main assumptions: firm cost principle, company discount rate 4.34%; employee discount rate 8.63%; acquisition cost = 85% of list 
price; depreciation 68-63% depending on segment; company car lifetime: 3 years; low private use = 10,000 km p.a.; high private use = 25,000 
km p.a. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
 
Subsidy rates appear rather uniform across segments, though with a slight tendency of higher 
subsidy rates for the smaller segments.
4 However, this can be attributed to the higher share of 
                                                 
3 The Polish rules have been under review during the course of this study, with a proposal to switch to a fixed 
imputation rate based on car value. Despite their appeal as theoretically one of the most accurate method of 
assessing the benefit-in-kind, they appear to be difficult to implement by tax authorities in practice. 
4 This is because the relative value of fuel provided by the employer is higher in the case of less expensive, 
smaller cars. In most of the EU Member States, company-provided fuel does not increase the taxable base for the 
employee, hence increases the subsidy. 
  6employer-provided fuel relative to the list price of the car, in the case of smaller cars, and the 
fact that fuel is most often not declarable for income tax.  
 
In the calculations above, we have implicitly assumed that there is no subsidy if the imputed 
rate is set at the right level, which is likely – other things equal – to lead to an underestimation 
of subsidy rates. The point is that gross labour income in many countries are subjected to 
social security contributions at the employer side while imputed fringe benefits are typically 
only subject to the tax rates that apply to wage income. As employers’ social security 
contribution rates in many EU countries exceed 10 percentage points, employees get an 
effective tax benefit even if the imputed tax base corresponds to the total costs of providing 
the benefits. However, the tax data that we had available for this study did not allow us to 
verify in a precise way across all countries the size of such effects.  
1.2.  MACRO EFFECTS: DIRECT FISCAL LOSSES AND CAR MARKET 
Overall size of subsidies and direct fiscal revenue effects 
The bulk of any possible impact of the subsidies will be felt in small to medium segments of 
the car market which account for the overwhelming share of both the privately and company 
owned car market cf. figure 1.1. Sales of cars up to the medium segment (not including the 
premium segments: upper medium and large which contain e.g. Audi A6 and Audi A8) 
accounts for 93 percent of all registered cars (85 percent by value). 90 percent of company 
cars belong to this range (81 percent by value). 
 
Figure 1.1: Structure of registrations by segment in 18 EU countries, 2008, millions of cars registered (volume) 
 
Note:  The 18 EU Member States include Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 
Source:  Polk (2009) and Copenhagen Economics 
 
Another clear pattern is the dominance of the company car in the upper segments. More than 
60 percent of all medium, upper medium and large cars are being company owned against 35 
percent or less for mini or small cars. This is arguably linked to both company cars mainly 
being offered to persons with above average salaries and hence a natural demand for more up 
marked models and the very fact that a progressive tax system makes company cars more 
  7attractive for employees in higher brackets of the tax system. The higher the marginal tax rate, 
the higher the net-of-tax value of low taxed fringe benefits. 
 
The direct fiscal consequences without taking into account any dynamic effects from the 
company car subsidies are substantial with a total revenue loss in the order of roughly ½ 
percent of EU GDP as an average for the countries included in the analysis, cf. Table 1.3., or 
€54 billion in total. The highest losses are found in countries with low imputation rates for 
calculating the benefits of company cars and, partly as a result, also a higher share of 
company cars in the overall economy. Our methods have been first to calculate the difference 
between the calculated tax base with current taxes rules and then compare that with the tax 
base resulting from a tax system with zero subsidies to company cars. This gap is then 
multiplied by the total tax wedge on labour income. It is a static calculation in not including 
dynamic affects: higher taxation of company cars would led to smaller and fewer cars being 
bought which lead to less revenues from fuel taxes as well as purchase and ownership related 
car taxes in EU which are substantial.    
 
Bearing in mind the relatively general manner the calculations have been done, we suggest 
that focus should be of magnitudes rather than precise country estimates. The latter would 
require further detail in terms of data and calculations.  
 




taxes rates, in 
percent 
Purchases of 
company car as 




Loss, billion € 
0-15 percent  56  1.9  0.8  25 
15-24 percent  52  1.2  0.4  8 
Above 24 percent  55  1.3  0.4  16 
Countries with other 
systems  58  1.3  0.6  5 
Total (weighted 
average)  55  1.4  0.5  54 
Note:  In the weighted average for each group, the share of total GDP within the group is used as a weight. In the total weighted average, 
the share of total GDP (of the 18 countries) is used as a weight. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
Effects on car stock, size of company cars and mileage 
Neither data availability nor well established methodologies allow us to draw very firm 
conclusions on how these strong subsides affect the sales of company cars, the entire stock of 
cars or the amount of miles being driven. The results presented below should thus rather be 
interpreted as possible orders of magnitude than precise estimates of effects. 
 
However, drawing upon a number of different sources, in particular two recent Dutch studies
5, 
we suggest that the results could be significant. The structure of the Dutch economy is 
relatively close to the EU average, particularly EU15, in terms of car density, share of 
company cars, income per capita, tax rates and company car subsidies level to make this a not 
too heroic an endeavour. We scale up these two studies to EU level by combining the 
behavioural effects from these two studies with our estimates of subsidy levels at the EU 
level. Using alternative assumptions, we estimate that the stock of cars may increase between 
8 and 21 million in EU, the price of company cars may be boosted with € 4.000 to 8.000 and 
fuel consumption may be 4 to 8 percent up. 
                                                 
5 Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007, 2009) 
  81.3.  WELFARE COSTS AND ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
 
Providing subsidies to company cars on a scale such as suggested in this study represents 
serious distortions of consumer choice: in essence making it artificially attractive for 
consumers to take home their remuneration in the form of cars. In fact, evidence from 
Belgium and the Netherlands suggests that this may be the case in practice. Pure business use 
represents only 20-30 percent of company car use, the rest being pure private use and home-
work commutes. 
 
Using the results from above and applying standard evaluation methods implies welfare losses 
in the order of €15 to 35 billion at the EU level (0.1 to 0.3 percent of GDP). The high 
estimates would follow from a direct application of the behavioural effects of company car 
subsidies from the Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007, 2009) studies referred to above, while 
the lower and more conservative estimates is based on behavioural effects more in line with 
the general literature on the determinants of car purchase etc. 
 
The relatively high estimates of welfare costs reflect the simple fact that company cars receive 
a large subsidy, are a large part of consumer purchases and are relatively price elastic. 
 
The environmental impact can be split into two main parts. The first part relates to energy 
consumption and resulting effects on CO2 emissions, bearing in mind that cars today are 
mainly driven by fossil fuels with biofuels or electrical cars accounting for only a fraction of 
the total stock of cars. The incentive to buy more and larger cars as well as very large subsidy 
to drive more miles will increase fuel consumption. The estimates in this report lay in the 
range of fuel consumption increasing with the above mentioned 4 to 8 percent and CO2 
emissions from car transport increasing by approximately the same amount corresponding to 
increases of 21 to 43 million tons, cf. Table 1.4. The two estimates are directly the result of 
the choice of the upper or lower estimate above. Most of the increase in fuel consumption in 
our study results from increases in the car stock and the size of cars; less from the large 
subsidy to fuel use.  
  
The second part relates to local adverse impacts such as increased noise and air pollution 
resulting mainly from particles from diesel engines etc. Undoubtedly, company car subsidies 
will have these effects, not the least as larger cars are being bought and more fuel is being 
used for commuting purposes, often in urban areas. Using our estimates of higher fuel 
consumption, would lead to resulting increases in NOx and HCs. In particular, when emitted 




                                                 
6 Mayeres, I. et al. (2001) 
  9Table 1.4: Total effects on emissions of CO2 and air pollution 
  Higher estimate  Lower estimate 
CO2 (carbon dioxide)  43 Mt  21 Mt 
Particulate emissions  1.9 kt  1.0 kt 
NOx (oxides of nitrogen)  50.6 kt  25.0 kt 
HCs (hydrocarbons)  13.7 kt  6.8 kt 
Note: Mt is metric mega tonnes. kt is metric kilo tonnes. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics and NERI (2007) 
 
1.4.  OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
 
The considerable tax losses, distortions in consumer choice and adverse impact on the 
environment make company car taxation an evident candidate for a reform. A key concern is 
the balance between administrative costs and getting a neutral and non-distorting tax system 
in place. 
 
Ideally, all costs involved for the firms should be measured as accurately as possible and the 
equivalent benefits should be fully imputed to the tax liability of the employee and exposed to 
the marginal tax rate. No countries are pursing such an approach presently and the likely 
explanation is that it would entail too high costs for all parties involved (tax authorities, firms 
and employees).  
 
Hence, we propose two main approaches. First, the rates for imputing the benefit of a 
company car as function of the car price should be raised significantly in a large number of 
EU countries. Second, the large subsidy to fuel consumption due to the non-taxation of free 
fuel provided by the employer should be replaced by a system that raises such costs in a way 
that is not too cumbersome to implement and enforce in practice, as discussed in chapter 4.  
However, from an environmental point of view, it is equally important to reduce the incentive 
to buy more and bigger cars, as this study suggests that this has a larger impact on total fuel 
consumption than the fuel subsidy. 
 
The question then is if the tax treatment of company cars should be transformed beyond tax 
neutrality by way of building in specific environmental motivated measures, such as a 
premium for buying or owning energy-efficient or low-emitting cars that do not exist for 
privately owned cars? This needs to be carefully reviewed.  
 
A key issue is whether such more piecemeal reforms are a complement for the alternative, 
which is to move towards the more neutral tax treatment of company cars. If company cars 
are already taxed in a neutral way vis-à-vis privately owned cars, then specific tax incentives 
only applied to company cars may backfire. An example: if company car taxation entails 
higher de facto taxation of cars with high fuel use than the same car owned privately, then the 
tax change may move such cars out of the company car market and into the privately owned 
regime. Moreover, the reduced taxation of company cars with low fuel consumption relative 
to the same car owned privately will have the opposite effect, moving ownership into the 
corporate regime. In other words, there is a risk of creating incentives to move cars to and 
from corporate ownership rather than affecting overall fuel consumption levels. 
 
By contrast, if specific company car fuel efficiency incentives are a substitute for tax 
neutrality, then they may actually produce net energy savings with more certainty. If company 
cars still are more attractive tax-wise in all segments relatively to a privately owned cars, in 
  10spite of tightening of taxation for the most fuel consuming cars, then such incentives lead to 
shifting towards more fuel efficient cars rather than opting out of the  company car regime 
altogether.   
 
As company cars are typically provided to middle and in particular higher income families
7, 
subsidies related to company car taxation are likely to benefit high-income employees more 
than low-income employees.
8 Both a higher position and a higher income (which are 
obviously correlated) increase the chance of having access to a subsidised company car.  In 
this sense, the tax system that favours company cars is not only environmentally harmful, but 
is also likely to have adverse distributional consequences. 
 
Chapter 2  PRINCIPLES OF COMPANY CAR TAXATION 
 
To assess whether taxation of company cars implies net subsidies, we go through a number of 
steps. First, we define why companies, also in the absence of specific tax benefits, might be 
interested in buying company cars to put at the disposal for the employees for both 
professional and private purposes (2.1). Secondly, we define some benchmarks for what could 
be considered a neutral treatment of the taxation of company cars with private use also (2.2). 
Thirdly, we review the actual tax rules applicable to company cars in EU both at the employee 
level (2.3) and the company level (2.4). Fourthly, we use this framework to provide estimates 
of net tax subsidies to company cars across countries and for different segments of the 
company car market (2.5).  
2.1. REASONS FOR PROVIDING EMPLOYEES WITH COMPANY CARS 
 
In practice there are three main reasons which explain why the provision of a company car for 
private use as a fringe benefit is attractive for both the employee and the employer. The first 
reason is that companies can supply the fringe benefit at lower costs than the employee is able 
to achieve – and consequently pass it on to the employee. Secondly, the tax system itself can 
encourage in-kind fringe benefits over monetary remuneration. Thirdly, firms may want the 
employee to drive in a car of certain minimum standard.  
 
Firstly, firms are able to supply the fringe benefit at lower costs than the employee is able to 
achieve. There are two main areas where firms have an advantage: 
 
•  lower costs of purchasing the car and fixed costs of insurance and maintenance
9 
•  lower financing costs of car ownership (or lower leasing costs) 
 
With respect to the investment cost in the new car, the employer’s advantage comes from 
firms’ greater bargaining power vis-à-vis car dealers which results in lower costs of 
purchasing new cars. Firms, which operate fleets of passenger cars (for example distribution 
firms) are often granted significant discounts by car dealers. On the other hand, if the 
employee were to buy the car privately, he or she would have a more limited bargaining 
power to achieve reductions off the car dealer’s list prices. Next, corporate fleet clients are 
likely to obtain discounts off list prices for insurance and maintenance.  
                                                 
7 As evidenced in this study by the very high fraction of high value cars that are being sold as company cars as 
well as by a recent Italian study on the take-up of fringe benefits, D’Ambrosio, C. & Gigliarano, C. (2008), 
8 D’Ambrosio & Gigliarano (2008) 
9 Cf. e.g. van Ommeren et al. (2006) 
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Firms will also be able to finance these purchases at a lower cost. Due to their scale, firms are 
more likely to have access to better terms of financing of capital purchases with cash than 
individual employees. Due to higher free cash flows, the opportunity cost of cash for 
companies will be lower than for employees. Furthermore due to larger scale, firms are also 
likely to obtain better terms for alternative financing options, such as operating or financial 
lease arrangements. In this respect, the employee will face search costs for favourable credit 
offers and potentially also switching costs if financial institutions are to be changed.
10  
 
Secondly, firms may want the employee to drive in a car of a certain minimum standard. 
Firms may have a variety of reasons for that, such as to attract employees who face significant 
commuting costs, to help employees generate more turnover, to increase productivity or as a 
status symbol.  
 
Thirdly, the tax system may itself encourage the provision of company cars for private use 
over other kind of remuneration such as wages or salaries (irrespective of the companies’ 
ability to supply fringe benefits at lower costs). Evidence from Belgium and the Netherlands 
suggests that company cars are to a very large extent used for private purposes such as home-
office commutes and other purely private purposes. According to these sources, pure 
business-related use constitutes only about 20 to 30 percent of company car use, measured by 
kilometres driven or frequency of trips, cf. Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1. Purpose of company car usage 
Country  Not business use  Business use 
Belgium* 67%  33% 
Netherlands** 78%  22% 
Note : No business use included private travel and work-home commutes (in Belgium) 
* proportions of business and not business trips in total annual mileage of company cars 
** percentage of employees with a company car who have not used this car for any business purpose during a period of three months. 
Source:   Belgium: Cornelis (2009), Netherlands: Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) 
 
In sections 0 and 0 we outline the actual taxation rules in Member States and provide 
estimates of ‘under taxation’ of the private use of company cars. 
2.2  BENCHMARKS FOR NEUTRAL TAXATION OF COMPANY CARS  
 
When the tax system favours private use of company cars, employees gain access to cars that 
they would not be able to afford themselves – typically more expensive, larger cars – and are 
likely to drive them more intensely than they otherwise would. Both of these effects increase 
the employee’s carbon footprint.  
 
On the other hand, a tax system that would not make driving in company cars more attractive 
than private cars would be neutral both from public finance and environmental points of view. 
What are the principles of such a neutral tax system? 
 
As a general rule, for a tax system to be neutral it must avoid subsidising specific kinds of 
consumption, i.e. the private use of company cars, in particular where the subsidised activity 
generates negative externalities. In this respect, car use gives raise not only to greenhouse gas  
and air polluting emissions, but also generates noise and congestion.  
                                                 
10 Literature gives evidence that both search costs and switching costs are likely to be important. 
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In practice, there may be two approaches to measure tax neutrality. One approach is to equate 
the value of taxable benefits for the employee (estimated by tax authorities) with the actual 
amount of costs borne by the employer providing the benefit. If the value of taxable benefits 
is less (greater) than firm costs, there is a subsidy (penalty) to the employee. We call this 
approach the ‘firm-cost principle’. Alternatively, the value of the taxable benefit declared by 
the employee should equal the before-tax cost for the employee of getting the same benefits. 
We call this the ‘opportunity cost principle’.  
 
The consequence of choosing either of these two approaches will be outlined below.  But the 
basic concept is the same: it is the firm that owns or leases the car and provides it to the 
employee. The difference is essentially whether the firm has more buying power in the car or 
capital market that implies that it can get the service at a lower cost than the employee and 
what consequences this should have for taxation at the employee side.  
 
Three basic types of costs 
To estimate the extent to which current tax systems subsidies or penalise private usage of 
company cars, it is necessary to include all the costs incurred by companies in providing the 
benefit-in-kind. We split the basic costs of a company car into three elements: 
 
First, investment costs. These include the costs of purchasing the company car, including both 
financing costs – interest costs of loan or lost revenue from foregone investment – and the 
loss of value of the car over its life time (depreciation). The more a car depreciates over its 
lifetime, the lower the resale value and the greater the cost to the firm.
11 
 
Second, costs related to insurance, motoring taxes, maintenance and periodic repairs. This 
group of costs is incurred by the company as the owner of the car and is, as such, generally 
not directly related to private use by employees. In other words, insurance premiums do not 
typically depend on the amount of kilometres driven so that the company would pay the same 
premium irrespective of the employee’s private use of the car. Likewise, many aspects of 
maintenance are undertaken on a periodic basis, e.g. an annual technical check or a twice-
weekly car wash, etc.  
 
There are indications that firms increasingly rely on leasing arrangements rather than 
ownership when providing cars to their employees. Essentially, it changes nothing vis-à-vis 
the employee. In a leasing arrangement, the firm deducts the annual fee from its gross income 
while with a company owned car it directly deducts costs of financing, depreciation, 
insurance, motoring taxes, maintenance and period repairs. Provided that the company and the 
leasing company face the same costs, then it changes nothing vis-à-vis the employee. 
Obviously, the firms use leasing contracts rather than ownership because it is more efficient: a 
leasing company can exploit market power and knowledge better than particularly smaller 
firms thus reducing costs of purchase and maintenance. But so can the private employee: lease 
the car rather than own it. The upshot is that we in this study in our subsidy calculations make 
no distinctions between company cars owned by the company or leased by the company and 
then put at the disposal of the employee.  
 
Third, fuel costs. The relevant fuel cost is the company cost of providing employees with fuel 
for private use, cf. Table 2.2. The size of this cost is directly related to the amount of private 
                                                 
11 Estimates of a company car lifetime by data providers Polk and Dataforce are between 3-5 years. 
  13use. As opposed to the acquisition cost of the car, the costs of fuel are clearly variable. 
Commuting is an important border line case. In this study we have included commuting as 
part of business related travel. 
 
Table 2.2: Typology of fuel costs and tax implications 
                                           
Fuel paid by 
 
Use of company car for 
Company  Employee 
Business purposes  No benefit-in-kind – No tax   Not relevant 
Private purposes  Fuel use: benefit-in-kind – taxable  Fuel use: no benefit-in-kind – no tax 
Note: Member states are not unanimous on classifying commuting;  tax rules treat commuting  in a company car as private or business travel.  
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
 
Our definition of a tax subsidy under alternative assumptions 
Having defined the relevant costs, we proceed with outlining our conceptual approach to 
estimating the subsidy levels using both the ‘firm cost’ and ‘opportunity cost’ principle. 
 
First, we calculate the annual equivalent value of overall costs to employer – and alternatively 
the opportunity costs for the employee – from the three categories of costs over the time the 
employee uses the car for private purposes which we assume is identical with the life time of 
the company car (three years in the basic example). Further assumptions include the price of 
the company car, the cost of insurance, taxes, maintenance and repairs and the intensity of 
private use which translates into the cost of fuel.  
 
The difference between the ‘firm cost’ and ‘opportunity cost’ approaches is outlined in Table 
2.3. We use acquisition price when using ‘firm cost’ approach and the list price when 
applying the ‘opportunity cost’ approach; the latter typically being higher as the employee 
typically will have less buying power. In addition we use slightly higher interest rates for 
investment costs when applying the ‘opportunity costs,’ reflecting the weaker position of the 
average private consumer in the capital market relative to an average firm. In practice, we do 
not find that subsidy estimates are very sensitive to a change of the calculation approach, cf. 
chapter 3. 
 
Second, we calculate the annual equivalent value of calculated imputed taxable benefits to the 
employee over the same period. We use the same cost items and assumptions as above; 
however, the value of the taxable benefits depends directly on the specific tax rules of the 
Member State in question. We emphasise that business-related travel is not taxed at employee 
level - only the private travel should be taxed at this level. Likewise, only the company-paid 
fuel provided to the employee should be subject to tax – while the amount of fuel paid for 
privately from after-tax income should not.  
 
Neutrality is achieved when these two values are equal, i.e. when the company cost of 
providing the benefit-in-kind is equal in value to the increase in the tax base of the employee 
receiving the benefit. Should company costs be higher (lower) than employee tax bases, the 
employee receives a tax subsidy (penalty).  
 
This study use the opportunity cost principle for subsidy calculations. We have in chapter 
three inserted some sensitivity analysis that allows for some appreciation of the importance of 
the choice of benchmark principle: firm or opportunity cost principle. 
  142.3 . TAXATION RULES IN MEMBER STATES: EMPLOYEE SIDE 
 
It is difficult to follow the principles of neutral company car taxation in practice. This is 
primarily because the information they require does either not exist at the time of the tax 
obligation, e.g. the depreciation of the car, or cannot be known with certainty, e.g. opportunity 
costs. A tax system functioning in real life will most likely be structured around simple rules 
to approximate the values of employee tax base. It follows that such systems are seldom 
neutral.  
 
In particular, there are difficulties with knowing the following cost ingredients with certainty: 
 
•  Depreciation: the value loss of a car over a three year period is not known to 
firm/employee before the car has actually been sold. 
•  Private fuel costs: At best, the kilometre breakdown between private and public driving 
may be known, but this is not the case for real underlying fuel use. E.g. 100 km driven on 
the highway will amount to less fuel used than 100 km driven in the city.  
•  Financing costs: The precise discount rates are neither known for firms nor employees 
when buying a car. 
 
Both our calculations as well as tax practice need to rely on simplified assumptions reflecting 
‘average’ circumstances. 
Tax rules at the employee side in EU: investment cost  
In this section we focus on the employee tax implications stemming from the part of the firm 
costs that have to do with car purchase (the investment costs). Most EU countries have tax 
elements on employee side which ‘mimic’ the investment costs of firms. Only in 4 Member 
States are investment costs not taken into account.  
 
In the case of many Member States, the annual taxable benefit is calculated as a percentage of 
the value of the company car. The value of the car is typically either the list price or the 
acquisition cost, i.e. the price actually paid by the company including discounts. Some 
countries use the concepts of ‘open market value’, ‘fair market value’ or ‘replacement cost’, 
cf. Table 2.3 for the explanation of these concepts and cf. Table 2.5. for the actual rules. 
 
Table 2.3: Concepts used in estimating value of company cars 
Concept  Explanation 
List price   Price that the employee would obtain when buying privately (opportunity cost approach) 
Acquisition cost  Price paid by the company, typically less than list price (firm cost approach) 
(Fair) market value or replacement cost  An amount estimated following a specific methodology of the tax authority. 
Source: Copenhagen  Economics 
 
Where the employee is required to report the car value as its list price, the tax base may turn 
out higher than if acquisition cost were required to be reported. In this respect, tax systems 
which allow the use of the acquisition costs – as opposed to list prices – grant employees the 
opportunity to benefit from firms’ purchasing power. 9 Member States calculate taxes based 
on the acquisition cost, 5 Member States use list prices, 4 Member States use either the 
market value or replacement cost concepts; while in two Member States the tax is not related 
to the investment cost, cf. Table 2.4. 
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Car price not explicitly 
taxed 
List Price  Acquisition price 
Market value or 
replacement cost 
List price and CO2 
emissions per km  
Belgium 
Estonia 




Denmark (cars < 3 yeas old)  
Germany 


















The United Kingdom. 
Note:   Missing countries are Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. It is not possible to identify the type of investment cost for: Bulgaria and 
Czech Republic. List price is the price paid by private customers to car listed. Acquisition price is the price paid by the company to the car 
dealer. Market value and replacement costs are calculated according to methodologies laid out by the respective tax authorities. 
Source: PWC (2006), PWC (2008) 
 
In most countries the percentage of the value of the car (imputation rate) used to calculate the 
tax base is fixed, e.g. the tax base is calculated as 20 percent of the car’s acquisition cost. A 
fixed percentage is an example of simple ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach whose intension is ease 
of application rather than accuracy.  
 
In some countries, however, the percentage depends on the level of private usage such that the 
more intense the private usage, the greater the tax. The actual ratio of private to business 
travel is to be provided by a logbook, over monthly or annual intervals, cf. France. A variation 
of this approach is to adjust the percentage according to schedules with thresholds of the 
amount of business mileage. High business mileage gives rise to lower tax, while the actual 
level of private use is irrelevant, cf. Ireland. 
 
There are Member States, where the employee is not taxed explicitly on the value of the 
corporate car in private use: Belgium, Estonia, Italy and Poland. In Belgium, Italy and Poland 
the tax base is calculated using official schedules of fixed km-rates for private travel. The 
fixed km-rates are typically designed to approximate car depreciation per mile, fuel costs, and 
the remaining variable and fixed costs of ownership (insurance, repairs). In Belgium and 
Poland they apply universally to all cars irrespective of their value. In Italy, however, separate 
schedules are available for given car models. In Estonia, on the other hand, there is only a 
fixed amount tax due, which neither depends on the car value nor the amount of private or 
business driving.  
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Country 
Taxable value for the 
employee of corporate car 
determined by 
Imputation rate (percent, per year)  
Austria  Acquisition cost incl. VAT  18% of acquisition cost, max €7,200 
Belgium  Car value not taxed  Fixed-km rates 
Czech Republic  List price  12% of list price, min. €432 
Denmark Acquisition  cost  25% of acquisition cost below €40,000  
20% of acquisition cost above €40,000 
Estonia  Car value not taxed  € 1,536 (fixed tax) 
Finland Open  market  value 
Vehicles 2006-2008: 16.8% of replacement price + €270 
Vehicles 2005-2003: 14.4% of replacement price + €285 
Vehicles before 2003: 12% of replacement price + €300 
France Acquisition  cost 
 
Two methods: 9% or 12% of acquisition cost (if private fuel paid by 
employer) or 20 percent 
Germany  List price  12% of list price 
Hungary  Acquisition cost (purchase price)   Lump-sum payable by company 
Ireland   Open market value 
30% if business mileage <=24,000 km 
24% if business mileage 24,000 < m <= 32,000 km 
18% if business mileage 32,000 < m <=40,000 km 
12% if business mileage 40,000 < m <=48,000 km  
6% if business mileage above 48.000 km 
Italy  Car value not taxed directly 
If car for both business and private use: 30% of ‘average cost of use’ 
based on 15,000km annual mileage, determined according to fixed 
km-rates. 
Luxembourg  Acquisition cost (purchase price)   18% of acquisition cost 
Poland  Car value not taxed   Fixed km-rates 
Portugal  Acquisition cost  9% of acquisition cost 
Romania  Acquisition cost (book value)  20.4% (adjusted by ratio of private travel) 
Slovakia  Acquisition cost  12% of acquisition cost 
Slovenia  Acquisition cost (purchase price)  18% in the 1
st year; 15.3% in the 2
nd year; 13% in the 3
rd year 
Spain  Acquisition cost   20% of acquisition cost 
Sweden  List price (defined by National 
Tax Board) 
Not applicable 
The Netherlands  List price  25% of list price 
United Kingdom  List price subject to level of 
emissions 
10% of list price if CO2 emissions are below 120g CO2/km 
15% of list price if emissions between 121-139 g CO2/km, increasing 
by 1% for each 5g CO2/km above 139g CO2/km , up to 35% 
(gasoline engines). Diesel surcharge 3%. 
Note: No information for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. 
Source: PWC (2006), PWC (2008), Copenhagen Economics 
Tax rules at the employee side in EU: costs related to insurance, motoring taxes, maintenance and periodic 
repairs 
In an overwhelming majority of Member State tax systems there are no separate rules 
concerning the taxation of costs related to insurance, motoring taxes, maintenance and 
periodic repairs. In the case of Member States where on the tax base is imputed as a fixed or 
variable percentage of the car value, we infer that the tax authorities have incorporated these 
costs implicitly in the percentage (imputation rate). In other words, we interpret that the figure 
‘25%’ which is used to calculate the tax base in Denmark on company cars of value below 
€40,000 already incorporates these costs – since there are no other rules. Likewise, we assume 
that designers of tax systems which use km-rate schedules have taken a provision for costs 
related to insurance, motoring taxes, etc. Because tax systems do not have separate tax rules 
for these costs, it is not possible to present the level of subsidy to the employee, stemming 
from individual elements of the benefit-in-kind. However, we do take them into account in 
calculating the total value of the benefit-in-kind received. 
Tax rules at the employee side in EU: fuel costs 
While the value of the company car can easily be documented, the value of company-
provided fuel turns out to be more difficult to assess for tax purposes. Company-sponsored 
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of a car. Member States have approached the issue of taxing company-provided fuel in several 
ways. One approach is to levy the tax according to km-rates which are calculated to 
approximate the actual fuel use, either for a representative vehicle or several specific vehicles. 
Another approach is to approximate fuel use by allowing employees to adjust the tax base due 
on the value of the car, i.e. the tax base is lowered when private use is low. The adjustment 
can be in ‘steps’ (the lump-sum method) or according to logbook (‘actual use’ method). A 
combination of the two is also possible in some countries. The last approach is to have no 
explicit rules on fuel use. Table 2.6 summarises the approaches to taxing fuel use. 
 
Table 2.6. : Summary of approaches to tax company provided fuel 
Valuation method  Definition 
km-rates  The value of the fuel is incorporated in km-rates. The value of the tax base 
increases directly in proportion to the number of km driven privately. 
Lump-sum method only 
Tax authority defines thresholds for car usage intensity with respect to mileage – 
and values of taxable benefits to be declared in personal income tax. The system 
offers simplicity and may pay off with intensive private use. 
Actual use method only 
Employee registers actual use in logbook. Value of taxable benefit determined by 
multiplying mileage by km-rates of tax. Benefit: lower tax when usage low. The 
UK is a special case where the actual value of fuel received is declarable.  
Choice-dependent  Employee chooses the most advantageous method from either lump-sum or actual 
use. 
Fuel not taxed explicitly  Tax authority does not explicitly take the  benefit of the company provided fuel 
into account. 
Source:   Copenhagen Economics 
 
Only 10 Member States have some rules on the taxation of the fuel part of the benefit-in-kind, 
with the intention to adjust the tax base to the actual use of the company car for private 
purposes. 
 
Those countries include the ones operating a km-rate system. Such tax systems require 
documentation of the actual km travelled in the form of a log book. Tax systems based solely 
on km-rates are not common, however. More often, countries combine this system with the 
possibility of adjusting the percentage relating to the car acquisition value according to pre-
defined thresholds of private use. The latter approach is applied in cases where documentation 
of private travel in the form of e.g. log books cannot be or have not been kept. Under some 
circumstances, it may also be possible for the employee to choose the most advantageous tax 
method, e.g. in France and Germany. The ‘actual use’ method would then be preferred by 
employees with few privately driven kilometres (the burden of proof would fall on them) 
while the ‘lump-sum’ would be preferred by employees with many private kilometres. 
 
Sometimes, there are several imputation rates in the lump-sum method, e.g. 9% for low 
private use or 12% for high private use in France, or 5 percentage thresholds defined 
according to private use in Ireland, cf. Table 2.5. The more thresholds there are, the better the 
approximation of the actual level of private use – and hence the higher the precision of the tax 
base calculation.  
 
A large group consisting of 12 countries does not, however, have separate rules concerning 
the fuel part of the benefit-in-kind, cf. Table 2.7. In practice this means that the fuel part of 
the benefit-in-kind escapes taxation. This creates the incentive to use the car intensely for 
private purposes – as long as the employer provides free, untaxed fuel. Systems with such 
incentives are present e.g. in Denmark, Estonia and Germany, where tax authorities do not 
estimate the value of employer-provided fuel in calculating a tax base explicitly. 
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Fuel not taxed 
explicitly 
Actual, log based dependent 
on fuel use (only) 
Lump-sum dependent 














No countries  Italy 











Note:   No information for Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. Lump-sum tax is computed based on pre-defined level of usage in 
terms of km driven. Actual tax is based on documented level of usage in terms of km driven. 
Source: PWC  (2008) 
2.4. TAXATION RULES IN MEMBER STATES: COMPANY SIDE 
 
Company tax rules can offer subsidies to company cars in two cases. The first case involves 
the treatment of company car depreciation for corporate income tax purposes. The second 
case concerns the deductibility of input VAT at the time of purchasing the car. The two cases 
are important because both depreciation (the loss of car value over time) and the VAT account 
for the largest fractions of ownership costs to companies. Therefore, it is important to check 
whether, and to which extent, companies can deduct such expenses from their income tax 
obligations.  
In what follows, we outline the mechanisms that lead to subsidising in both cases, and analyse 
the actual tax rules in the Member States to conclude whether subsides occur.  
 
We find that the depreciation rates specified in Member States’ accounting rules generally 
reflect well market depreciation rates, and therefore are not subsidising company cars. The 
lack of subsidy-generating distortions in depreciation rules is not surprising, given that 
accounting rules are designed on the basic premise of reflecting a truthful and accurate 
representation of company assets. Furthermore, national accounting rules in EU Member 
States are to an increasing extent based on international accounting standards such as the IAS, 
or the GAAP.  
 
The very fact that firms can deduct a leasing fee or a depreciation charge while an employee 
cannot is not by itself a subsidy. Any costs associated with gross remuneration of employees 
should be deductable provided it is taxed at the employee side. The problem arises from the 
fact that cost borne by the firm is not reflected fully in a corresponding raise of the tax base of 
the employee. 
Deductibility of input VAT on company car and other car tax issues 
In certain Member States, corporate buyers of cars may be entitled to a VAT deduction of the 
price paid for the car whose purpose is dual, i.e. both business and for private employee use
12. 
Most often, countries follow one of two models of determining how VAT is levied in the case 
of company cars. The first model is that the VAT is deductible for the company and typically 
                                                 
12 Countries typically distinguish between the use of the car (strictly business, or dual use) and the type of 
company that purchases it. VAT is nearly always deductible for companies for whom the cars are the main 
production assets, such as taxi companies or driving schools. For companies where cars are not the main 
productive assets, there can be restrictions on VAT deductibility.  
  19the employee using the car in private becomes liable for VAT levied on the value of the 
benefit-in-kind received. The second model is that VAT is not deductible for companies, and 
consequently the employee is also not liable to VAT.  
 
The first model is used, for example in Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Estonia, 
and a variation is used in Spain and Italy. In those countries, when a company acquires a car 
for a dual purpose (business use and private use by employee), the VAT is technically levied 
in one of the two methods described below: 
 
•  Companies are entitled to full VAT deduction. Employee pays VAT on the value of the 
benefit-in-kind received. 
•  Companies are entitled to partial VAT deduction, which is reduced by the VAT due from 
the employee on private use (which ‘automatically’ compensates for private use) 
 
The second model is when the majority of companies
13 are not entitled to VAT deductions, 
and therefore are liable for full VAT on the purchase price. In such cases, typically the private 
use of the car by the employee is not liable to VAT. Such a system is in operation, for 
example in Denmark, France, Sweden and the UK cf. Table 2.8.. The rows describe the VAT 
treatment of the company’s purchase. The columns describe the VAT implication for the 
employee.  
 
Table 2.8.: Deductibility of input VAT for companies and VAT treatment of private use, 21 EU member states, 
2008 
VAT on private use  VAT on acquisition of cars for 
business and private use by 
company  Not subject to VAT  Subject to VAT 
Not deductible  Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Sweden, UK, Slovakia  Czech Rep., Hungary, Romania 
Partly deductible  Italy, Spain  Belgium, Poland 
Fully deductible    Estonia, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
Note:   Detailed tables presented in annex. 
Source: PWC (2006), PWC (2008) and Copenhagen Economics 
Deductibility of company car depreciation  
When companies buy durable production assets, they are allowed to deduct the amount by 
which the asset depreciates in any given year from the corporate income that is declared for 
tax purposes. When companies are allowed to deduct depreciation dual-purpose cars in the 
same manner as for other durable productive assets, then the tax rules are not distorting.  
 
We find that in the EU, the right to deduct depreciation is the same for all company cars, 
irrespective of whether they are used for business only or if they are used for both business 
and private purposes
14.  
The  relevant question to find out whether tax rules are subsidising is: How does the 
deductable amount of depreciation determined by the rules compare to the actual rate of 
depreciation of cars in the market? A subsidy arises when deprecation rules allow for annual 
                                                 
13 Nevertheless, transport companies, leasing companies, taxi companies, driving schools may be entitled to VAT 
deductions. 
14 Generally, we find that depreciation rules apply to all company cars in the same way, irrespective of whether 
cars are used solely for business or whether they have dual-purpose as business and privately used cars. This is 
opposite than in the case of VAT rules, where in the case of some countries, the purpose of the car must be 
declared, and only partial VAT deductions are allowed for dual-purpose cars.  
  20deductions that exceed the actual depreciation in the market. The company would save on 
income tax essentially in the form of interest free loan15. Conversely, deductions which fall 
short of the actual market depreciation rate would increase the income tax liability of the 
company. Finally, the case when book depreciation equals market depreciation is neutral.  
 
To carry out the above analysis of tax rules, we require a comparison with the actual 
depreciation of cars in the market. The true market depreciation rates are notoriously hard to 
estimate, however approximate depreciation rates are compiled, among others, by fleet 
management companies.
16 They suggest that company cars lose roughly 66 percent of their 
original value over the first three years of ownership, cf. Table 2.9.. This is equal to a yearly 
depreciation rate of about 22 percent. 
 
Table 2.9.: Market rates of depreciation, value lost after 1 year, in percent 
Polk segment  Percentage of original value lost after 1 year 
Large  22.1 
Upper Medium  21.4 
Lower Medium  22.7 
Medium  21.9 
Small  21.8 
Mini  21.8 
Average  21.9 
Source: www.fleetnews.co.uk, Polk (2009) and Copenhagen Economics 
When comparing the average annual market depreciation to the depreciation rates allowed by 
Member State accounting laws, we notice that in practice, rules give companies some 
flexibility to choose the appropriate depreciation rate. Specifically, companies are often 
allowed to apply a depreciation rate that reflects the pattern in which the car’s economic 
benefits are consumed by the enterprise.17 For example, some countries specify permissible 
intervals (e.g. Romania, 11-33 percent per annum). In such cases, we conclude that the annual 
rates of deprecation are similar to or below the market rates of depreciation (20-22 percent).  
Following this approach, we do not find that the most common fiscal depreciation rules 
exceed market depreciation in any Member State.
18 On the contrary, we find that in the case of 
10 Member States accounting depreciation rates are similar to market rates, while in another 
10 Member States the rates can in fact be below the market rates, cf. Table 2.10. 
 
                                                 
15 If tax depreciations exceed the actual fall in market value, the difference will be added to the income tax base 
in the year where the car is sold. The advantage is then the excessive deductions in the tax base in the years up to 
the disposal which creates an interest free loan: the size of the loan is also determined by the size of company tax 
rate. 
16 For an overview of the factors driving market depreciation rates in passenger cars, refer to: 
http://www.intellichoice.com/carBuying101/UnderstandingDepreciation. 
17 This is consistent with the International Accounting Standards (IAS) rule 16.  
18 In our review, we concentrated on the rules applying to the most commonly purchased company cars. In 
certain countries, depreciation rules may be designed so as to promote special cars, such as environmentally 
friendly cars. For example, in the UK, firms are allowed to fully depreciate environmentally friendly cars in the 
first year, which de facto constitutes the “interest free” loan provided by tax authorities for the purchase of such 
cars by firms. 
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Deductibility of depreciation for tax purposes  Country 
Tax deductible depreciation higher than market depreciation No  countries 
Tax deductible depreciation similar to market depreciation   Denmark,  Estonia,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden 
Tax deductible depreciation lower than market rate  Austria, Belgium, Czech R., France, Greece, Ireland, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, UK 
Not known  Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta 
Note: In Finland, depreciation is only deductible for business use, however the rate is not known. 
Source:   PWC (2006) and PWC (2008) 
 
Chapter 3  SUBSIDIES AND WELFARE EFFECTS AT THE MACRO LEVEL 
 
Starting with the conclusion from above, that all segments of the company car market receive 
significant tax subsidies, we review in this chapter the size of overall tax subsidy and related 
fiscal and environmental implications. First, we provide some basic facts about the 
composition and size of the company car stock in EU (3.1). Second, we provide on this basis 
some macro-level estimates of the overall size of tax subsidies in Member States countries 
(3.2). Third, we present some ball park estimates of the subsidies effect on the size and 
composition of the company and other cars being sold in most recent years (3.3). Fourth, we 
outline the possible impact on CO2 emissions and energy use resulting from these effects 
(3.4). 
3.1.  NUMBER AND STRUCTURE OF COMPANY CARS 
 
In this section, we analyse the amount of cars in 18 EU Member States, and distinguish 
between private and company registrations within each of six identified segments. We base 
our analysis on the latest available registration statistics from 2008 provided by Polk and 
described in the appendix.  
 
The data covers vehicles registered as M1 type approval. 
Company cars in the EU 
We find that company registrations account for about 50.5 percent of the 11.6 million 
passenger cars registered across the 18 EU Member States in 2008. Company sales accounted 
for 5.7 million passenger cars, while private sales accounted for 5.9 million cars, cf. Table 
3.1.. The relatively large share of company cars means that company cars are de facto very 
common in the EU.
19 
 
Table 3.1: Passenger car registrations in 18 EU countries 2008 
   Registrations 
  Company  Private  Total 
Car sales, 2008  5.7 million  5.9 million  11.6 million 
Average of registrations to 
total sales  50.5% 49.5% 100% 
Note: The countries included are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics and Polk (2009) 
Company car segments in the EU 
Cars purchased by companies are predominantly in the small, lower medium and medium 
segment – collectively the three segments account for about 85 percent of company cars. 
                                                 
19 This is in line with similar observations reported in the literature, for example Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007). 
  22However, these three segments are also the most popular ones among private consumers, 
accounting for essentially the same proportion of registrations: 83 percent.  
  
However, differences in the shares of company and private cars become more pronounced 
when we look at the six individual segments. At that level, we find a strong tendency that the 
relative share of company cars increases with the size of the segment. For example, in the 
mini segment, company cars account for 31% of the approximately 1 million cars sold in the 
18 EU countries in that segment. In the most popular lower medium segment, the share of 
company-registered cars rises to 48% out of the 4.25 million total registered cars in the 18 EU 
Member States. In the largest car segment (comprising the premium car models) the 
dominance of company registrations is overwhelming, with a share of 76 percent of sales. The 
size of the large segment, however, stands at 70,000 units in 2008 and is dwarfed by the 
remaining segments, cf. figure 3.1..  
 
Figure 3.1: Structure of registrations by segment in 18 EU countries, 2008, millions of cars registered (volume) 
 
Note:  The 18 EU Member States include Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 
Source:   Polk (2009) and Copenhagen Economics 
Company cars at the country level 
The absolute number of company car registrations is correlated to the size of the total car 
market in a country. Not surprisingly, the largest amount of company car registrations, 1.23 
million, is in the country with the largest number of total registrations, Germany. Likewise, 
the smallest number of company car registrations, approximately 20,000 units is in 
Luxembourg, the country with the lowest number of total registrations. 
 
However, the share of company cars in total registrations in 2008 varies substantially across 
the countries. The lowest share of company cars is in Greece, with only 24 percent company 
car registrations. The highest share of company cars is in Germany, 60 percent. On average 
across the 18 surveyed EU Member States, the share of company cars amounts to 49.5 
percent, c.f. Table 3.2.  
 
  23Table 3.4: Structure of registrations by country, 19 EU member states, 2008 









Share of company 
registrations 
Austria 0.14  0.15  0.29  52% 
Belgium 0.28  0.26  0.54  48% 
Czech Republic  0.08  0.05  0.14  40% 
Denmark 0.09  0.06  0.15  38% 
Finland 0.08  0.06  0.14  44% 
France n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Germany 1.23  1.83  3.06  60% 
Greece 0.20  0.06  0.27  24% 
Hungary 0.09  0.06  0.15  39% 
Italy 1.47  0.70  2.17  32% 
Luxembourg 0.03  0.02  0.05  45% 
Netherlands 0.23  0.27  0.50  54% 
Poland 0.15  0.13  0.29  47% 
Portugal 0.07  0.09  0.16  55% 
Slovakia 0.05  0.02  0.07  34% 
Slovenia 0.03  0.04  0.07  54% 
Spain 0.63  0.53  1.16  46% 
Sweden 0.10  0.15  0.25  60% 
United Kingdom  0.89  1.24  2.13  58% 
Total, 19 EU countries  5.85 5.74  11.59  49.5% 
Note:  The 19 EU Member States include Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. No information on company and 
private registrations is available for France. 
Source:  Polk (2009) and Copenhagen Economics 
3.2. ESTIMATES OF RELATIVE TAX BASE SUBSIDIES AND DIRECT REVENUE EFFECTS  
 
In this section we outline the estimates of tax subsidies to private use of company cars. We 
start by presenting the average subsidy level across the 18 countries and then proceed with 
breakdowns by country and by segment. Finally, we present the detailed subsidy rates for 
each surveyed country and segment. In all cases, our subsidy estimates assume low and high 
private mileages.  
Average subsidy across the 18 EU Member States 
The (weighted) average subsidy levels across the 18 surveyed countries are 23 and 29 percent 
of the underlying car value, respectively for low and high private mileage, cf. Table 3.3. The 
weighted average takes into account the value of total registered cars in the countries, and 
therefore is more illustrative of the aggregate situation in the EU. The subsidies are calculated 
assuming the firm cost methodology fully described in detail in Part B of this study (an 
abridged description is available in Annex E). Table 3. contains results for the individual 
Member States. 
  
Table 3.3. : Average subsidy across the 18 EU Member States 
  Company car share  Subsidy, low private 
mileage 
Subsidy, high private 
mileage 
Simple  average  50% 23% 27% 
Average weighted by value  55%  23%  29% 
  24Note: The weights used to calculate the EU weighted average are the values of the total car registrations by country. Included countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Main assumptions: company discount rate 4.34%; employee discount rate 8.63%; acquisition 
cost = 85% of list price; depreciation 68-63% depending on segment; company car lifetime: 3 years; low private use = 10,000 km p.a.; high 
private use = 25,000 km p.a. The methodology is fully described in Part B of this study, while an abridged description is available in Annex E. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics and Polk (2009) 
Average subsidies at the country level 
When analysing the average subsidy level across countries, we first analyse the variation 
between countries and then turn to the variation within a country (the difference between low 
and high mileage). 
 
The relatively high average subsidy level presented above arises from a population of 
relatively diverse individual subsidy rates between countries. The range spans from -4 percent 
in the case of Poland to as much as 47 percent in Greece, for simple averages reported in 
Table 3.4. We find that the average subsidies across all car segments fall below the 10 percent 
range only in the case of two countries, Finland and Poland. The large span is a good 
illustration of two extreme tax systems: tax authorities in Poland use leasing prices observed 
in the market as proxies for the value of the benefit-in-kind, while in Greece there is no tax on 
private use of company car. In the remaining countries, tax authorities approximate the 
taxable value of the benefit-in-kind most importantly as a function of the car price.  
 
Within countries we find that the level of subsidies is higher for high private mileage. Once 
again, this is a consequence of the simplified tax rules which typically assume a fixed amount 
of private travel when valuing the benefit-in-kind. There are only two countries which 
penalize high private use of company cars – France and Sweden. Interestingly, the Polish 
system, using market leasing rates that ensure low overall subsidies, actually gives higher 
subsidies to the large car segment. 
 
High private use is most often encouraged in countries where fuel use or km driven are not 
taken into account in calculating employee tax base: Austria, Estonia, Denmark, Finland 
(lump-sum rule), Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Though in France and Czech Republic the tax systems do take 
fuel costs into account, however more intense private use does not have a significant effect on 
diminishing the level of subsidy. 
 
  25Table 3.4: Estimates of subsidies across 19 EU countries, high and low private mileage, 2008  












 Simple  averages  Weighted  averages 
Austria  52% 25% 30% 58% 23% 27% 
Belgium  48% 33% 38% 54% 33% 38% 
Czech  Republic  40% 28% 35% 48% 27% 33% 
Denmark  38% 12% 15% 46% 12% 15% 
Finland  44% 9% 13%  47% 8% 13% 
France  N.A. 32% 21% N.A. 31% 20% 
Germany  60% 27% 33% 64% 27% 32% 
Greece 24%  42%  47% 26% 42% 47% 
Hungary  39% 33% 39% 46% 33% 38% 
Italy  32% 29% 33% 39% 28% 32% 
Luxembourg  45% 23% 27% 50% 22% 26% 
Netherlands  54% 13% 18% 61% 12% 17% 
Poland 47%  -10%  -4%  53%  -12%  -5% 
Portugal  55% 33% 37% 59% 32% 36% 
Slovakia  34% 31% 37% 42% 30% 36% 
Slovenia  54% 24% 29% 56% 23% 28% 
Spain  46% 22% 26% 47% 21% 25% 
Sweden  60% 16% 14% 64% 17% 16% 
United  Kingdom  58% 16% 22% 61% 16% 22% 
Simple  average  67.15%  22%  26%     
Average weighted 
by value 
    55%  24%  27% 
Note: The weights in the weighted average are the relative values of the segments, per country. To calculate the average across countries, we use 
the value of the company car registrations in the country as weight. Included countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Main 
assumptions: company discount rate 4.34%; employee discount rate 8.63%; acquisition cost = 85% of list price; depreciation 68-63% depending 
on segment; company car lifetime: 3 years; low private use = 10.000 km p.a.; high private use = 25.000 km p.a. The data for France is partly 
missing. The methodology is fully described in Part B of this study, while an abridged description is available in Annex E. 
Source: Polk (2009) and Copenhagen Economics 
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Average subsidies across segments at the EU level 
Across the 18 EU Member States the level of subsidy tends to decline with the price of the 
car, i.e. lower subsidy rates for up-market segments. This is particularly noticeable for 
subsidies under high private mileage, c.f. Table 3.5. One explanation for this phenomenon lies 
in the fact that the increasing fuel costs are typically not taken into account in taxation 
systems based on imputed tax rates levied solely on the value of the car, while the value of 
company-provided fuel constitutes a larger share of the value of the benefit-in-kind for 
smaller car segments, whose value is lower.
20 
  
On the other hand, the rather uniform subsidy for the low private use may be a reflection of 
the fact that the level of imputation rates applied by tax authorities across the 18 EU Member 
States may assume a private use close to 10,000 kilometres per year – as assumed in low 
private mileage case in this study.  
 
Table 3.5: Estimates of subsidies in 6 segments across the EU, 2008 sales 












  Simple averages  Average weighted by values 
1  Mini  31% 24% 31% 31% 29% 35% 
2  Small  37% 23% 30% 37% 27% 32% 
3 Lower Medium  51%  22%  27%  51%  25%  28% 
4  Medium  65% 22% 25% 65% 23% 25% 
5 Upper Medium  70%  22%  24%  70%  22%  23% 
6  Large  76% 23% 24% 76% 22% 22% 
Simple average  67%  23%  27%       
Weighted average        50%  25%  29% 
Note: The weights in the weighted average are the relative values of total sales of passenger cars by countries, within a segment. To calculate the 
average across countries, we use the value of the total car registrations in the country as weight. Included countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom. Main assumptions: company discount rate 4.34%; employee discount rate 8.63%; acquisition cost = 85% of list 
price; depreciation 68-63% depending on segment; company car lifetime: 3 years; low private use = 10,000 km p.a.; high private use = 25,000 
km p.a. 
Source: Polk (2009) and Copenhagen Economics 
Fiscal losses 
While we repeat that the estimates should be interpreted with caution, our results indicate that 
the direct fiscal losses could approximate up to ½ percent of GDP for the EU as a whole 
cf.Table 3.6.. They tend naturally to be highest in countries with very low imputation rates 
and at the same time substantial yearly purchases of company cars such as in Germany and 
very small at the other end in such countries as Denmark. The methodology for calculating 
fiscal losses is explained in Annex D, the numbers should be seen as ball-park estimates given 








                                                 
20 This is because the relative value of fuel provided by the employer is higher in the case of less expensive, 
smaller cars. In most of the EU Member States, company-provided fuel does not increase the taxable base for the 
employee, hence increases the subsidy. 
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Table 3.6: Direct fiscal losses and its determinants, 18 EU member states, 2008 






Loss, share of 
GDP (%) 
 
Loss, in billion 
€ 
0-15 percent  Greece  0%  52%  0,6%  0,3%  0.8 
  Portugal  9%  54%  1,5%  0,5%  0.8 
  Czech Republic  12%  52%  0,7%  0,3%  0.4 
  Germany  12%  56%  2,1%  0,9%  22.9 
  Slovakia  12%  43%  0,7%  0,1%  0.2 
  Weighted 
average/Total  11%  56%  1,9%  0,8%            25.1 
15-24 percent  Sweden  9%+extras  65%  1,1%  0,3%  1.1 
  Finland   17%  58%  1,1%  0,2%  0.3 
  Austria  18%  57%  1,6%  0,6%  1.6 
  Luxembourg  18%  54%  2,1%  0,6%  0.2 
  Slovenia  18%  48%  2,1%  0,6%  0.2 
  Spain  20%  45%  1,1%  0,4%  4.0 
  Weighted average / 
Total  16%*  52%  1,2%  0,4%  7.5 
Above 24 
percent  Denmark  25%  61%  1,1%  0,2%  0.6 
  Netherlands  25%  52%  1,3%  0,2%  1.5 
  United Kingdom  25%  47%  1,4%  0,4%  5.9 
  Italy  30%  64%  1,1%  0,5%  8.2 
  Weighted average / 
Total  27%  55%  1,3%  0,3%  16.3 
n.a.  Belgium  n.a.  68%  2,0%  1,2%  4.1 
  Hungary  n.a.  65%  1,1%  0,8%  0.8 
  Poland  n.a.  45%  0,7%  0,0%  0.0 
  Weighted average / 
Total  n.a.  58%  1,3%  0,6%  5.0 
  Total weighted 
average / Total  18%*  55%  1,4%  0,5%  53.9 
Note:  In the weighted average for each group, the share of total GDP within the group is used as a weight. In the total weighted average, 
the share of total GDP (of the 18 countries) is used as a weight. France is not included. The loss as share of GDP for Poland is set to zero. * 
Sweden is not included in the calculated weighted average. The marginal tax rate for each country is an average weighted by the value of 
company cars in the 6 segments. 
Source: Copenhagen  Economics 
Examples of tax systems promoting large cars 
We find that only 7 out of the 18 surveyed tax systems actually promote large segments more 
than small segments. These are the systems where the tax base is not proportionately 
dependent on car value, and therefore give rise to higher subsidies to larger cars: i.e. Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Poland and Sweden. Austria provides a case-in-point of 
a system promoting large cars since there is a ceiling on the maximum increase in the tax 
base.  
 
However, we note that in systems where the relative subsidy may be approximately constant 
or slightly declining in larger segments, the absolute amount of subsidy increases, which may 
also promote larger cars.  
Examples of systems promoting high private use 
We find that the level of subsidy rises significantly when private use increases, especially in 
the case of cheaper cars. For example, it is common to observe the level of subsidy for a car in 
the mini segment to increase by about 10 percentage points when use is high.  
 
  28However, the increase in the subsidy is somewhat less pronounced for more expensive cars. 
The intuition is that the share of the fuel in the value of the benefit-in-kind is smaller for 
larger and more expensive cars. In general, however, there is evidence that a number of 
current EU tax systems favour more intensive private use of a company car.  
Sensitivity of subsidy calculations 
In this section we investigate the sensitivity of subsidy calculations with respect to two 
aspects: 
 
•  Case 1: the switch to an opportunity cost principle as opposed to the firm cost principle currently used in this 
study. 
•  Case 2: company purchase advantages with respect to more favourable purchase conditions and financing 
costs. 
 
In the first case, we test for the influence of the measurement concept employed in the 
calculation of the subsidy. The calculations presented in the report are based on the firm cost 
principle meaning that the subsidy measures the difference between the value of the benefit-
in-kind as provided by the firm (at a cost) and the imputed tax liability for the employee. The 
alternative discussed in Chapter 2 is to use the opportunity cost approach which measures the 
difference between the cost the employee would have incurred when buying the same car and 
the amount of fuel using after-tax personal income. While the firm costs always will be 
smaller than opportunity costs, the imputation rate will remain the same in both cases as they 
are exogenously determined by legislation. Hence, the first sensitivity analysis measures the 




Table 3.7 summarises the results of the sensitivity analysis. 
 
Table 3.7: Expected effects from the first sensitivity analysis 
  Countries following acquisition 
cost principle 
(i.e. discount off list price) 
Countries following list price 
principle 
Switching to opportunity cost approach 
Subsidy increases more, 
typically by 2-3% 
Subsidy increases less 
typically by about 0-1% 
Note: The countries following the acquisition cost principle are: Finland, Luxembourg, Austria, Hungary, France, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain. The countries following the list cost principle: Czech R., Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden. The results are mixed for the 
rest of the countries.  
Source: Copenhagen  Economics 
 
The subsidy will increase in all countries, since opportunity costs are larger than firm costs as 
firms have purchasing advantages. Thus, moving to the opportunity cost approach for 
calculating the subsidy increases the value of the car but does not change the amount of tax 
declarable as this is determined by the tax rules. Hence the subsidy increases. In countries 
where the imputed tax is currently calculated with acquisition costs, the subsidy will increase 
more relative to countries where the list price is used as tax basis
21. 
 
                                                 
21 Moving to the opportunity cost approach, there will still be an increase even in countries whose tax rules 
require stating list prices of the car. This is precisely a reflection of the fact that imputation rates can only 
approximately assess the correct (neutral) amount of the tax. The increase in the subsidy in this case is a sign of 
the “inability” of imputation rates to capture the correct amount of tax due. 
  29In the second case, we test for the influence of the company purchasing advantage used in the 
calculation of the subsidy according to the firm cost approach. The company purchasing 
advantage manifests itself through two parameters, namely the amount of discount the 
company is able to obtain off the car list price and the financing cost advantage over the 
employee. Changing these parameters changes both the value of the firm cost as well as the 
imputed tax
22. We measure sensitivity with two scenarios of parameters: 
 
•  Scenario 2a: removal of company purchasing advantages, where the borrowing costs are 
equalised across firms and employees and set to the average rate (6.5%) and the company 
discount off the list price is removed. 
•  Scenario 2b: large company purchase advantage: where the company borrowing cost is set 
at 2.5% while employee discount rate is 12.5%, and companies pay 75% of the list price. 
 
Table 3.8.summarizes the results. 
 
Table 3.8: Expected effects from the second sensitivity analysis 
Purchasing advantage and financing advantage                                      Effect 
Valuation of benefit  Decreases (scenario 2a)  Increases (scenario 2b) 
List price tax base countries  Subsidy increases, by 2%  Subsidy declines, by 2-3% 
Acquisition cost tax base countries  Subsidy unchanged  Subsidy unchanged 
Remaining countries  Subsidy increases, by 2%  Subsidy declines, by 2-3% 
Source: Copenhagen  Economics 
 
Scenario 2a 
In countries following the list price principle, where the imputed tax is fixed, removing the 
company purchasing advantage increase the subsidy by about 2% (increase the value of the 
benefit-in-kind received while keeping the imputed tax unchanged). In countries following the 
acquisition cost principle, the subsidy remains essentially unchanged, as the imputed tax base 
changes in line with the company purchasing advantages. In the remaining countries, the 
subsidy also increases by about 2%. This is driven by the fact that in those countries the 




In countries following the list price principle, where the imputed tax is fixed, increasing the 
company purchasing advantage reduces the subsidy by 2-3% (higher company purchasing 
advantages mean lower value of the benefit-in-kind received while the imputed tax remains 
unchanged). For acquisition cost countries, the subsidy remains unchanged, for the same 
reason as before. Finally, the subsidy declines by 2-3% in the remaining countries. 
3.3. EFFECT OF SUBSIDIES ON THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF COMPANY CARS 
AND TOTAL CAR MARKET 
 
While this study has established the first (nearly) comprehensive estimates of the level of 
subsidies across the EU to company cars, it does not examine changes over time. Hence, it 
provides very limited ability to evaluate the effects of historical changes in the taxation of 
company cars and its effect on either the stock of company cars or the overall car market in 
                                                 
22 As opposed to the first sensitivity analysis where the imputed tax remains unchanged.  
  30the Member States of EU. We have therefore embarked upon an evaluation strategy that uses 
primarily other sources to provide estimates of the effect of such subsidies while providing 
initially an overview of the car purchase pattern within EU including shares of company cars. 
The overall evaluation is thus empirically based on three elements: 
 
•  Broad brush determinants of car purchase patterns in EU 
•  Extrapolating the two studies by Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007, 2009) on company 
car subsidies in the Netherlands to EU level 
•  Evaluations of changes in actual registrations of company cars due to changes in company 
car taxation rules in UK and Denmark 
Broad brush determinants of car purchase patterns in EU 
The main driver of car purchases within the EU is per capita income. The higher the income 
level the higher the spending on cars per capita cf. Figure 3.2. However, there are also other 
important determinants revealed by the fact that a large group of countries with roughly the 
same income per capita levels spend substantially different amounts on car purchases. This 
applies, in particular, on the countries with per capita income above the EU average. One of 
many determinants is of course the high purchase taxes, as in Denmark and the Netherlands 
(cf. figure 3.2. panel B).  This pulls these countries below the dotted line, which depicts the 
average relation between per capita income and car purchases cf. panel A in figure 3.2. 
 
  31Figure 3.2: Effects of per capita income and purchase tax on car purchases, 25 EU member states, 2008 
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Panel B: One-off taxes (excl. VAT) as percentage of car net price, 27 EU member states 
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Source: Copenhagen  Economics, Eurostat and ACEA (2008) 
However, a question in this study is whether high subsidy rates for company cars could be one 
of the factors that explain why some countries spend relatively small amounts on cars relative 
to their income levels. Simple examination of the line in Figure 3.2.  panel A provides some 
weak support for this. The share of company cars is the highest in the high income countries 
with high subsidies for company cars and also a relatively high level of total spending on cars 
(cf. figure 3.3.) We have chosen to focus on countries with fairly equal income levels to avoid 
structural factors linked to e.g. the stage of economic development to influence results. 
However, we would not hesitate to push this result too far since we essentially only have one 
observation of tax rules per country and a limited number of countries.  
 
  32Figure 3.3: Relationship between size of subsidy and shares of company cars in total registrations, EU member 
states with above average GDP per capita, 2008  
 
Note: The low mileage subsidy is presented. The new Member States: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Greece have not been 
included. 
Source:   Copenhagen Economics 
Dutch studies on subsidies to company cars 
There are very few micro studies that actually look at the specific effects of company car 
subsidies over the most important range of effects for the purpose of this study. Two recent 
Dutch studies
23, however, provide promising evaluations of effects using micro data of Dutch 
households from the period of 1995 to 2006 They are evaluating the effects on the 
 
•  The total stock of cars 
•  Price of cars being sold to households 
•  Number of kilometres driven 
 
The study starts off by calculating the size of subsidies in the Dutch tax system. The imputed 
tax base is 22 percent of the value of the car at the time the studies were made; while the 
study suggests that a fully neutral system would require an imputed tax base of over 50 
percent of the car value. Given high marginal tax rates in the Netherlands, this provides very 
substantial incentives to shift remuneration in the direction of company cars.  The calculations 
in this study suggest that the level of tax subsidies are somewhat smaller, mainly as a result of 
this study not taking into account the advantage of repair and maintenance services being tax 
deductable at the firm level while not being added at employee level. 
 
Taking the study on its face value, it suggests that the company tax system as it existed before 
the raise of the rate of imputation from 22 to 25 lead to: 
 
•  An increase in the stock of cars of 5 percent 
•  Average company cars being bought being € 9,000 to 12,000 more expensive 
•  Number of kilometres being driven increasing by 1,500 kilometres 
 
                                                 
23 Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007, 2009) 
  33The effects are very large; the study has estimated these effects on the basis of the implicit 
price elasticity from subsidy rate to price of car being bought as 2 (in numeric terms) which is 
very high. Likewise, the effects of company car subsidies on car ownership (cars per family) 
were also substantially above conventional estimates. 
 
However, Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007) provides convincing evidence of strong effects 
of the high level of company car subsidies and we have hence used this study as the best 
gauge of effects at the EU level in the absence of specific studies of similar quality in other 
countries. Moreover, the overall company car environment in Netherlands is relatively close 
to other EU countries with respect to the importance of the company car market, income per 
capita (relative to EU15 at least) and overall tax rates.  
 
Based upon this evaluation, we have scaled up the Dutch results to EU level by doing 
essentially three things. First, we have scaled the results by comparing our estimates of the 
Dutch subsidies with our estimates of the EU level subsidies.  This may lead to 
underestimations of effects as we have not included in our subsidy calculations that fringe 
benefits are typically taxed at lower rates than gross wage income
24  Second, scaling the 
results by taking into account the size of the EU stock of cars, average prices of EU cars etc. 
Thirdly, baring in mind the high price elasticities in Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007) we 
have also offered more conservative estimates using lower, conventional elasticities. 
 
Under such heroic assumptions, the effects at the EU level are (the effects are spelled out in 
more detail in annex): 
 
•  Increase in the stock of cars of approximately 8 to 21 million cars 
•  Increase in the average value of EU company car of  perhaps € 4000 to 8000 
•  Increase in the total kilometres driven by each company car equivalent to an increase in 
fuel consumption of 4 to 8 percent. 
 
Whether policy evaluation should put most faith in the upper or lower range depends on a 
number of factors. Low range estimates may be most prudent to use as upper end range come 
from a single study and as this study is also based upon a number of assumptions about 
company car markets.  
 
Arguments for using the upper end range could be that our study systematically 
underestimates the effective subsidy resulting from fringe benefits being taxed at lower rates 
than gross wage income as discussed earlier. Also, the fuel subsidy effect on mileage is likely 
underestimated in Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) as it does not include the effect on it 
may have on choice of residence: the fuel subsidy makes it less expensive to drive longer to 
work and hence less expensive to live further from the work place.  
 
As a final argument for upper end range, Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007) assumes that 
the price effect on the company car can be scaled up to the whole car market by looking at 
ratio of the stock of company cars to the entire stock of cars.  As company cars at some point 
become privately owned, typically after 3-5 years company ownership, so the effect on the 
overall car market are likely to be higher.   
 
If systematically half of all cars are being purchased for company car purposes, they will also 
more generally drive the composition and size of the secondary market through a number of 
                                                 
24 Gross wage income is also subject to employers social security contributions. 
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will tend to have larger and more cars than otherwise due to the subsidies. That will also 
affect fuel consumption. At the same time, the owners in the secondary market do not receive 
the same subsidies to own these cars, so the “oversupply” of more expensive, subsidy driven 
company cars to the secondary market should increase the market loss that companies – or 
leasing companies – face when offloading these cars, thus driving up the cost of providing 
company cars to employees.  The size of this effect somewhat depends on how EUs internal 
market for secondary market works: will a high supply from Germany’s large company car 
market lead to net exports to other countries affecting secondary car prices both in Germany 
and importing countries? 
 
Answering these highly relevant questions though goes beyond the scope of this study, but 
may merit further attention. 
Review of changes in actual sales of company cars to possible changes in taxation 
We have looked at two countries - UK and Denmark - with significant changes in company 
car ownership over the last 10 years and reviewed the role of changes in taxation of company 
car in that respect. The UK provides a case in point, where taxes on company cars have been 
substantially increased against the background of historically very large share of company 
cars in total registrations. According to an evaluation carried out by HM Revenue & Customs 
(2006) the large cut in tax subsidies appears to have changed the composition of company 
cars (promoting more CO2 efficient cars) rather than diminished the share of company cars in 
total registrations. 
 
In April 2002 the UK Government revised the company car tax regime in order to reduce the 
carbon emission (CO2) and protect the environment.  
 
The reform, announced already in 1999 and detailed in the budget of 2002, meant that the 
taxed benefit-in-kind arising from having a company car for private use would be calculated 
by referring to the car’s list price and CO2 emission. Prior to the reform, the employee had an 
incentive to drive more business miles that needed in order to exceed a threshold of either 
2,500 miles or 18,000 miles. This would in turn lower the benefit-in-kind from 35 percent to 
respectively 25 or 15 percent of the list price. At the same time, company car owners which 
were allowed unlimited fuel use which are subjected to a surcharge – the Company Car Tax 
Fuel Benefit Charge - were also subjected to a tightening.
25 
 
Following the tax reform company cars are still taxed as a percentage of list price and mileage 
driven, however the exact percentage of tax is determined by the approved CO2 emissions 
figure of car. 
 
The outcome of the tax reform in the UK has been the increased efficiency of company cars 
as well as the reduction of the total number of company cars. In 2005 the number of company 
cars had been reduced by one third to 1.2 million cars since 2001, while the total number of 
registrations decreased approximately 1.5 per cent yearly to 2.7 million cars in 2004. The 
average CO2 emissions figures from company cars were close to 15 g CO2/km lower in 2004 
that would have been the case if the reform had not taken place. The survey results suggest 
that around 60 percent of company car drivers, being able to choose the type of company car, 
were influenced by the tax reform and as a result chose cars with lower CO2 emission 
                                                 
25 House of Commons (2006), p. 47. 
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26. Moreover, there are clear signs that remuneration patterns have responded with 
more cash remuneration off-setting reduction in car benefits, suggesting that tax incentives 
have an impact on structure of employee compensation
27. 
 
However, such reported effects should be seen in the context of at least two factors. First, the 
share of employees receiving free private fuel has been declining since the late 1990s, i.e. 
prior to this reform. Second, there are indications that the tightening of fuel standards within 
the company car taxation has shifted the purchase of fuel consuming cars to privately owned 
cars where penalties for driving cars with high fuel consumption are less
28: this illustrates the 
perils of just.  
 
The Danish system for taxing company cars was tightened considerably from 2000. Until that 
year, the imputed tax base was calculated as 25 percent of the value of the car up to a price of 
DKK 400,000 with no imputed tax base calculated if the price of the car exceeded that level. 
Obviously, that provided a major incentive to provide remuneration for high income 
employees in the form of luxury cars bearing in mind that the top rate of income tax in 
Denmark at that point was above 60 percent for all full time employees. However, starting in 
2000, the part of the car price that exceeded DKK 400,000 was included in the tax base with 
an imputation rate of 20 percent. 
 
No formal evaluation of this tightening has taken place, but our evaluations indicate that this 
major increase in effective taxation must have had a major effect. First, the sales of company 
cars costing more than 1 million DKK fell dramatically already in 2000 while the sales of 
company cars costing between ½ million DKK and 1 million DKK rose and those of the cars 
costing less than ½ million DKK were roughly unchanged. The price ranges should be viewed 
in the context of high Danish registration taxes and a 25 VAT rate that implies that the 
consumers pays roughly 3 times the factory price for a newly registered car. The latter 
category of cars costing less than ½ million DKK is by far the most important in volume in 
Denmark. At the same, comparable patterns were observable in the overall sales of cars in 
Denmark. Bearing in mind the dominance of company cars in the higher price segments that 
is perhaps not surprising, but it does suggest that higher taxation of high level company cars at 
least in Denmark led to a down-sizing of cars rather than simple switching from company to 
privately owned cars.  
                                                 
26 HM Revenue & Customs: (2006), Eurostat: New Registrations. 
27 Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007) 
28 Anable and Bristow (2007) 
  36Figure 3.4: Car sales in Denmark, 1999-2008 
Panel A: Company car sales in Denmark, 1999-2008 
 
 
Panel B: Total car sales in Denmark, 1999-2008 
 
Panel C: Company car’s share of total sales, 1999-2008 
 
Note: In Panel A and B the index is calculated so 1999=1. 
Source:   Copenhagen Economics and De Danske Bilimportører 
 
As high value cars typically are more heavy and installed with more powerful motors, it suggest that the Danish tax 
reform in addition to removing a tax based incentive to shift remuneration in the direction of car consumption has 
also reduced fuel consumption.  
3.4. EFFECT OF SUBSIDIES ON ENVIRONMENT: CO2 EMISSIONS AND ENERGY USE 
 
The estimations above suggest that subsidies to company cars lead both to more and larger 
cars being bought as well as more miles being driven. However, the effects cannot at this 
stage be assessed with large degrees of certainty. Despite large variations in subsidy rates to 
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take this as an indicator of company car subsidies having limited effect on actual behaviour; 
indeed the experiences from UK, Netherlands and Denmark does suggest that tax regimes for 
company cars may have strong effects on the composition of company cars as well as the total 
stock of cars. We conclude instead that other important country specific factors that we have 
not been able to isolate in this study accounts for this pattern. 
 
The two Dutch studies
29 do provide some basis for providing an overall estimate of the effect 
of fuel consumption: 
 
  A higher stock of cars leads to more fuels being consumed. A highly simplified 
approach is to scale up consumption with the increase in the stock. A more realistic 
assumption is to assume that the additional car is smaller and driven fewer miles than 
the primary and more expensive company car 
  A more expensive car also uses more fuel per driven kilometre all through its life time, 
i.e. also when it passed over to private ownership. We use a simple correlation 
between car price and car efficiency to calculate this effect while assuming that the 
overall share of company cars in new sales is the best proxy for the share of the 
present or former company cars in the total car stock 
  We use the direct estimates of more kilometres being driven per company car to 
evaluate the direct effects of fuel subsidies on fuel consumption. 
  
Using such an approach, we find that total fuel consumption from cars may be increased by as 
much as 4 to 8 percent in EU, see annex C. This translates into an effect of CO2 emissions of 
a corresponding amount equalling 20 to 40 millions tonnes of CO2 for EU27 as explained in 
annex D. The lower and upper estimates follows directly from the lower and upper estimates 
on car stock, sizes of cars and kilometres driven per company car referred to earlier in this 
chapter. 
Effects on congestion, accidents, noise and air pollution 
As opposed to CO2 emissions, modelling the impact of subsidies on congestion, air pollutants 
noise and accidents is more difficult to carry out in a meaningful fashion. This is, on the one 
hand because of the assumptions underlying the construction of externality coefficients, and 
on the other hand the localised and time-varying nature of the externalities. 
 
One approach to derive the contribution of the subsidy to the size of externality could be to 
use measures of the marginal social cost of an externality, such as provided in CE Delft 
(2008) and multiply them by the econometric estimate of the subsidy on the volume of car 
stock. However, there are a number of shortcomings which limit the usefulness of this 
approach in practice. In order to be used meaningfully, the externality coefficients require a 
number of separate econometric estimates, such as estimates in different areas – urban, small 
urban and rural areas. Furthermore, the coefficients require rather precise data on mileage – 
also at the local level. Even though the average number of business and private km driven by 
a private car can be proxied, it would not contain the required breakdown between the 
different areas. 
 
On the other hand, the application econometric estimates of subsidy effects on the 
composition of cars would not be meaningful given the assumptions embedded in the 
                                                 
29 Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007, 2009) 
  38externality coefficients. For example, congestion externality coefficients do not distinguish 
between different effects of large and small cars – assuming that the impact is the same. 
 
Table 3.9: Subsidy effects on congestion, noise and accidents 
Econometric estimate 
of effect of subsidy 
on: 
Congestion  Noise  Accidents 
Value of expenditures on 
cars  Uncertain effects  Uncertain effect, larger cars 
may generate more noise. 
More expensive cars have 
uncertain effect – e.g. 
uncertainty about safety 
features vs. more powerful 
engines 
Volume of cars 
Increase in the number of cars in 
a specific area increases 
congestion. However, the effect 
is strongly localised. 
Increase in the number of 
cars in a specific area 
increases the intensity of 
noise. However, the effect 
is strongly localised. 
Increase in the number of cars 
in a specific area increases the 
probability of accidents 
 
Share of large cars 
 
Large cars may marginally 
contribute to more congestion 
e.g. in urban settings. Strongly 
localised. 
Larger cars may generate 
more noise. However, the 
effect is strongly localised.  
Large cars are may be more 
accident-prone  
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
 
Lastly, aggregate econometric estimates of subsidy effects lack the required time dimension. 
Using such estimates would make the calculate effects on externalities difficult to interpret. 
For example, car congestion is typically an issue in urban settings and often occurring only at 
rush hours but at regular intervals. In rural areas, congestion may occur e.g. in the summer 
holiday season. 
 
However, as company cars are extensively used for commuting purposes subsidies are likely 
to impact adversely and substantially urban environments in the form of increased noise, 
congestion and air pollution. Using the estimates of the  effects on fuels consumption, our 
very simple calculations show increases in particulates of 1 to 2 kilo tons, of NOx of 50 to 25 
kilo tons and HCs of 7 to 14 kilo tons cf. Table 3.10 that summarises the effects on CO2 
emissions and air pollution. We will refrain from making an EU estimate as such for overall 
environmental costs, as these are highly depending on the area in which emissions take place. 
 
Table 3.10: Total effects on emissions of CO2 and particulates 
  High estimate  Low estimate 
CO2 (carbon dioxide)  43 Mt  21 Mt 
Particulate emissions  1.9 kt  1.0 kt 
NOx (oxides of nitrogen)  50,6 kt  25,0 kt 
HCs (hydrocarbons)  13,7 kt  6,8 kt 
Note: Mt is metric mega tonnes. kt is metric kilo tonnes. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics and NERI (2007) 
Overall welfare effects 
There is a straightforward distortion in consumer markets as consumers through tax incentives 
are being encouraged to consume more car services than they would have been otherwise. The 
size of this distortion can in principle be measured in a very simple manner using the so-
called ‘rule of half’: the welfare loss is equal to the size of the subsidy multiplied by the price 
elasticity of the subsidised good.
30  
 
If we use our ‘scaled up results’ of Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007, 2009), we can in fact 
derive the adverse welfare effects from each of the three effects observed, namely larger car 
stock, purchase of more (expensive) company cars and increase in mileage. In total, the 
                                                 
30 Cf. e.g.Varian (1992) quoted in Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007)  
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GDP) see Annex B.  
 
The results are strictly conditional on the assumption that no other imperfections such as other 
subsidies/taxes are affecting the results. In other words for such countries as Denmark and 
indeed the Netherlands with high and potentially distorting registration taxes, the increase in 
car purchases induced by company car subsidies may in principle be welfare enhancing. It 
does not imply that company car subsidies in those countries are a good idea: a shift to a 
lower registration tax, more taxation on kilometres driven, and also a reduction of the tax 
subsidies for company cars would be preferable in the Denmark and the Netherlands from a 
welfare economics perspective. 
 
A second proviso is the interaction with environmental objectives. If for example the pricing 
of carbon in the particular country was already below the level needed to deliver on agreed 
climate change objectives for that country, then a company car subsidy with a side effect on 
emissions de facto increases the welfare loss associated with this under pricing. The same 
applies in principle with countries that had at the outset over priced externalities. We will 
come back to this in the policy section.  
 
There is also a substantial tax loss resulting from the subsidy. Disregarding all dynamic 
affects, including effects on income from fuel taxes as well as taxes related to car ownership, 
such tax losses may amount to as much as ½ percent of EU GDP as described above. The tax 
loss requires compensating higher tax rates elsewhere which implies a potential reduction in 
labour supply and hence loss of output. Recent literature suggests that the loss of output 
exceeds easily 20 cents for every € 1 raised in taxes in countries with relatively high taxes 
rates such as EU countries
31.  While company car subsidies may increase labour mobility and 
may be seen as a carrot that induces more work effort for example to become eligible for (a 
larger) company car, it is unlikely that this compensates for the need to raise tax rates to pay 
for these subsidies.  This is an issue that deserved further analysis as discussed below. 
 
However, as this study has demonstrated that lower taxes on company cars lead to more cars 
being bought and more miles being driven. This stems from the fact that car use – both 
ownership and fuel purchases – are taxed at higher rates than other consumption. This implies 
that the tax losses from the favourable tax treatment of company cars, when including 
dynamic effects, could be smaller than the estimates presented above (table 3.6.) indicate. 
 
                                                 
31 See for example Dahlby, B. and Ferede, E. (2009) which provides an estimate of an output loss of 10 to 30 per 
cent of the ex-ante tax revenue increase (page 27) or or Kleven, H. J. and Kreiner, C. T. (2003 that provides even 
higher estimates particularly for high tax countries within EU (table II). 
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Chapter 4  POLICY OPTIONS 
 
When considering policy options, we suggest that the first priority should be to focus on the 
most blatant distortion namely the incentive for employees to take home their overall 
remuneration in the form of car benefits. As suggested in this report this may give a welfare 
loss in the order of €50 billion. 
 
The second issue is to decide what instruments that should be applied to deal with this 
distortion bearing in mind the constraints that tax policies in this area are facing in practice. 
We are looking primarily at two kinds of distortions. First, the subsidies in place encourage 
employees to buy more expensive cars than they would have in the absence of the subsidy. 
Secondly, the widespread non- or low taxed use of fuel for the car means cars are being used 
more intensively than otherwise. This will, in turn, aggravate adverse environmental effects of 
the private car use (CO2 emissions, air pollution, noise and congestion). 
 
Ideally, we should put in place measures that accurately target both of these distortions. The 
first distortion calls forth a higher general imputed rate for calculating the tax base for the 
fixed costs of the car, while the latter  would require that the employees pay litre per litre for 
actual consumption used for private purposes.  
 
While the choice of the appropriate imputation rate for the fixed costs (financing, depreciation 
and maintenance) requires some subjective assessment of the appropriate discount rates,  costs 
of maintenance etc, it is relatively straightforward to implement in practice. However, the 
majority of EU countries apply too low rates. By contrast, requirements to register and control 
the number of kilometres driven for private consumption purposes may introduce substantial 
administrative costs for employees, firms and tax administrations that exceed the efficiency 
gains from a better taxation structure. This is an issue we have not investigated and where 
further examination is necessary.  
 
An important and binding constraint on reforms is the basic fact that it seems productive for 
society that cars are used for both private and business purposes. Flatly prohibiting the use of 
company owned cars from being used for private purposes would imply that the cars would 
not be used after business hours – are thus remaining underutilised, leading to efficiency 
losses.   
 
Moreover, a system that requires the employee to own the car when used for both business 
and private purpose also provides difficult questions. If the employee rented the car to the 
company when driving it for business purposes, the question would be: what rates of 
compensation per kilometre would be acceptable for the tax authorities? Should it depend on 
the price of the car i.e. implicitly assuming that the firm would get more value from the 
employee driving a BMW 520 than a FIAT 500 due to (1) reputation factors, (2) a more 
comfortable drive boosting productivity as well as (3) the capacity to occasionally 
transporting more passengers? Moreover, such a system would require the employee to 
register kilometres used for business trips instead of private trips which is no relief in practice 
relative to the car being owned by the company and the employee being taxed on private use. 
Total kilometres driven equal private plus business trip: counting one element is counting the 
total. 
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to the company rather than the company owning the car with employee being taxed on 
imputed income does not by it-self solve some basic choices that policy makers have to make 
about the purpose of company cars in the first place as well as the ability to control 
compliance in practice.   
 
From this perspective the best solution seems to be to increase the rates for imputing the tax 
base applied on fixed costs and increase considerably the taxation of free fuels provided by 
the employer. One option to achieve the latter would be to divide employees with a company 
car into two basic groups for tax purposes.  
 
The first group will not be allowed to receive any free fuel but may be reimbursed for fuel 
when the company car is used for declared and verifiably business purposes. If commuting is 
accepted as a business purpose, the compensation should be a flat rate subsidy based upon 
estimated travel length. This group will then fall into the same category as company 
employees that use their own car for this purpose. This regime would be applicable to a very 
large group of employees who rarely use the car for other purposes than commuting. The tax 
law could stipulate that employees who drive less than say 3,000 kilometres per year 
excluding commuting for business purpose could not receive free fuel.  
 
The second regime would be applicable to sales personnel and others with a very large 
number of kilometres driven. They could potentially choose between two options. Either 
accept filling in a log book and receive fuel consumption based upon that. Or get free fuel but 
accept then a higher imputed income base as a proxy for the more private mileage that would 
follow. 
 
At the same time it should bring the compensation that employees get for transportation costs 
when using their own car for either business-to-business travel or commuting into line with 
the taxation of company cars for the same purposes. Ideally, the tax system should not 
influence the choice between the use of a private car/public transportation or a company car 
for such purposes. In practice it implies that reforms of company car taxation needs to reflect 
such considerations of tax neutrality.  
 
So the bottom line in this first part of the policy option review is: 
 
•  Remove distortions to consumer choice by getting taxation of car company fringe benefits 
in line with basic wage remuneration.  
•  Aim for tax neutrality between the use of a private car/public transportation and a 
company owned car in the contact of pure business travel and commuting. 
 
The third issue to discuss is whether taxation of company cars should be used to deal with 
policy objectives going beyond distortions of consumer choice such as attaining EU and 
national environmental goals. Beyond doubt, a system that encourages the use of more and 
larger cars as well as driving more miles is at odds with EU and national efforts to promote 
energy savings, reduce greenhouse gases as well as local environmental damage related to 
noise, congestion and emissions of air polluting substances.  
 
This leads into a classical discussion of first, second and third best policy options. Once we 
have got rid of the specific incentive of overspending in company cars, should we ‘overtax’ 
company cars to attain environmental objectives. Some countries have moved along that 
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also firms to buy company cars with low emissions as discussed above. 
 
Our recommendation is essentially to refrain from such measures for several reasons. The first 
and most simple reason is that there is a substantial risk of overkill and non-transparency in 
policy delivery. At present, Member States are moving forward with a number of initiatives 
that are far more effective in attaining environmental objectives than building additional, 
discretionary elements into the company car taxation. 
 
The first best approach is to tax the environmental objective at its root. The objectives of 
reducing CO2 emissions are best met by implementing CO2 taxes, as certainly countries have 
already done. Also in the transport sector several different types of taxes already exist (cf. 
Table 4.1.). Local adverse environmental impacts from cars in the form of noise, air pollution 
and congestion are perhaps most adequately addressed by road pricing. The Dutch and Danish 
government have already decided to implement such charges in 2010. Entry pricing in city 
centres, already implemented in Stockholm and London, for instance, represent a simple form 
of such road pricing. 
 
The second best approach to address the CO2  externality would be to include energy 
efficiency in the taxation of cars either at the purchase point or for the entire stock of cars 
through ownership charges. Moreover, the EU has adopted new legally binding emission 
targets for car manufacturers that de facto also imply internal incentives inside the firms to 
move the production into the direction of less fuel consuming cars. 
 
The inclusion of energy efficiency requirements into subset of the car market, such as 
company cars, therefore seems to us to be much less effective and also less cost-efficient than 
the solution described above. The UK experience also shows that tightening on part of the 
overall car tax system creates the risk of “leakage” to the private owned car market, as 
underlined in a recent evaluation of the UK system
32 and also noted in chapter 3 on the UK tax 
changes. 
 
Table 4.1.: CO2 based user charges and registration taxes, selected 17 EU member states, 2008 
  Ownership tax  Registration tax Bonus System  Road Pricing 
Austria, Portugal, Spain   X X   
Belgium    X*    X   
Cyprus  X X  X   
Denmark,  
Netherland 
X X   GPS-based 
Finland, Ireland, Malta  X X     
France    X*  X  X   
Germany  X      
Italy     X   
Luxembourg  X   X   
Romania   X     
Sweden  X   X  Toll-based 
United Kingdom    X*       
Note:  X* implies specific incentives for company cars 
Source: ACEA (2008a) and Copenhagen Economics 
 
                                                 
32 Anable and Bristow (2007), page 75 
  43ANNEX A: CALCULATING SUBSIDY EFFECTS ON CAR STOCK, CAR PRICES 
AND CAR TRAVEL. 
 
Approach 1: Generalising the findings in Puigarnau and van Ommeren  (2007, 2009) to the 
EU In two very exhaustive and well-documented papers, empirical evidence on the effect of 
company cars is presented for three types of effects: 
 
•  Total stock of cars 
•  Price of the (the most expensive) car households are using 
•  Mileage 
 
The estimation methodologies are consistently the same. The demand for cars and travel are 
estimated using household micro data where the provision of a company car to the family is 
linked to that family’s overall car demand in these three dimensions. 
 
Total stock of cars (Puigarnau and van Ommeren  2007) 
 
The study finds that the subsidy-induced increase in the stock of cars in the Netherlands 
amounts to 365,000 cars, which corresponds to 5.4 percent of the total stock of cars in the 
Netherlands (6.8 million). 
 
Assuming that the subsidy effect on car ownership in the EU is the same as in the 
Netherlands, and given that the average subsidy level in the EU is 1.7 times higher than in the 
Netherlands, the corresponding increase in the car ownership due to subsidy amounts to 9.0 
percent (5.37 percent multiplied by 1.68). In 2006, 9.0 percent of the EU car stock amounted 
to 20.8 million cars. Table 5.1 describes the details of this approach. 
 
Table 5.1: Effects of EU company car subsidies to stock of cars 
Step  Amount  Approach  Source 
Effect of subsidy on car 
ownership   +5.4% 
The study finds the subsidy increases the car 
stock by 365 thousand cars. Given that the 
stock of cars in the Netherlands amounted to 
6.8 million cars in 2002, the subsidy increased 
the car stock by 5 percent 
Puigarnau and van Ommeren   
(2007) 
Eurostat for the stock of passenger 
cars in the Netherlands, in 2002. 
Size of subsidy in the 
Netherlands   14% 
Simple average of subsidies assuming low and 
high mileage found in this study for the 
Netherlands 
The current study 
(Puigarnau and van Ommeren  
(2009) study substantially higher) 
Size of EU subsidy   24%  Simple average of subsidies assuming low and 
high mileage found in this study for the EU 
The current study 
(Puigarnau and van Ommeren   
(2009) study substantially higher) 
Effect of subsidy   9.0%  (24/14) times 5.4 percent  The current study 
EU passenger car stock, 2006  230 million cars    http://ec.europa.eu/:transport/publi
cations/statistics/statistics en.htm 
Generalised effect of subsidy on 
car ownership in the EU  20.8 million cars  9.0% of 230 million  The current study 
Note:   The figures are rounded off to 1 decimal point. The figures are rounded off to 1 d.p. 
Source: Copenhagen  Economics 
 
Price of the most expensive car (Puigarnau and van Ommeren  2009) 
 
Using data from a Dutch household panel survey from 1995 to 2006 and a Dutch car panel 
survey from 1990 to 1993 the study search to estimate the effect of company car provision on 
household car demand. Controlling for many factors the study finds that the value of the most 
expensive car in the household increases by between € 9,000 to 12,000 which is very likely to 
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-2. 
 
Using the price elasticity from in the Puigarnau and van Ommeren  (2009) study we can 
determine the effect of an increase in the subsidy on the value of the (most expensive) car in 
the household. The average price of a car in EU is €30.760
33 and the average subsidy in the 
EU is 24%. Using a price elasticity of -2 gives an increase in the value of the car of €8,200. 
The details of these calculations are provided in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2.: Effects of company car subsidies to price of most expensive car in family 
Step  Amount  Approach  Source 
Average price of company car in EU  €30.760  Sector-weighted average list price of cars in the 
EU.  Polk (2009) 
Subsidy in percent  24 percent  Weighted average subsidy as percentage of the 
underlying car price 
The current study 
(estimate in Puigarnau and van 
Ommeren (2007, 2009) 
substantially higher) 
Effect on average car price, in 
percent  24% * 55% = 13%  55% EU average tax wedge multiplied by the 
average subsidy level 
The current study 
(implicit estimate in Puigarnau and 
van Ommeren substantially higher) 
Implied price elasticity   -2    Puigarnau and van Ommeren 
(2009) 
Effect on average car price in €  €30.760  *2 * 13% 
= €8193  Approximately €8,200  This study 
Source: Copenhagen Economics, Polk (2009) and Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) 
 
Effect on kilometres driven 
 
The study estimates that the number of kilometres per year goes up by 1,500 per company car 
cf. Table 5.3..  In the Netherlands, in as most other countries, the marginal use of fuel is non-
taxed for tax purposes, so that the marginal subsidy rate is 52 percent. The actual effect on 
driving patterns may depend substantially on country specific circumstances, but we have 
assumed effects in other countries given same marginal tax rate.   
 
Table 5.3.: Effects of company car subsidies on kilometres driven 
Step  Amount  Approach  Source 
Effect of subsidy on kilometres  1,500 
The study looks at travel effects on work days, 
week-ends and holidays. No significant effects 
are found for work days, so the results are 
related to holidays, including weekends. 1200 
more miles for commuting 
Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) 
 
Size of fuel subsidy in the 
Netherlands  52%  Given non-taxation of marginal use of fuel, the 
subsidy rate equals the marginal tax (52%).   The current study 
EU fuel subsidy   55%  Average of marginal tax rates  The current study 
Effect on kilometres per 
company car in EU  1,595  55/52 x 1500  The current study 
Effect on kilometres driven by 
company cars  28.1 billion km 
Stock of company cars (17.6 million units in 
2008, calculated as sum of sales in 2006, 2007, 
2008) times the effect per company car (1.585) 
The current study 
Polk (2009) 
Effect on fuel demand per car  94.0 litres 
1,585 extra km per car 
 
Segment weighted efficiency of company car 
stock in Europe: 5.9 l / 100 km 
The current study 
Effect on fuel demand in total  1.66 billion litres  Fuel per car (94.0) multiplied by company cars 
(17.8 million)  The current study 
Source: Copenhagen  Economics 
 
Two of the implied elasticities in the Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007, 2009) seem in the 
high end. 
 
                                                 
33 Weighted by segment value. 
  45First, the effect on the stock of the cars seems high.  In the Puigarnau and van Ommeren 
(2007) the empirical marginal effect of a company car on household car ownership is found to 
be 0.46
34. In their dataset, a household without company car has on average 1.35 cars
35. This 
gives a relative effect of company car of 34 percent (0.46/1.35). The study finds the implicit 
price subsidy for company cars in the Netherlands in the range of 30.3 percent and 24.6 
percent
36. We take the average of them, 27.5 percent. This gives an implicit price elasticity of 
-1.2, calculated as 0.34/0.275.  This should be seen against a general literature of perhaps 0.5 
percent for the joint effect of car purchase and fuel costs on car ownership, cf. Table 5.4..   
 
Table 5.4.: Summary of long run elasticises for car ownership and car travel in literature 
  Car travel  Car ownership 
Car purchase costs  –0.42 a) 
-0.46 d) 
-0.1 to -0.5 b) 
-0.08 e) 
-0.12 d) 
Average  -0.4 -0.2 







Average  -0.3 -0.3 
Note: The upper and lower value is an interval of different studies results. Averages are calculated as simple averages of the available estimates.  
Sources: 
a) Goodwin (2003) 
b) Ubbels, (2006); Johansson and Schipper, (1997); Dargay and Vythoulkas, (1999); Goodwin et al., (2004) reported in Gutiérrez-i-
Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007) 
c) Goodwin et al., (2004); Brons et al., (2006) reported in Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007) 
d) Dargay (2007)  
e) Goodwin et al. (2004) found in OECD (2008c)  
 
Second the effect on the most expensive car in the household i.e. the company car seems high. 
The Dutch itself suggest that general price elasticities for the demand for new cars are around 
unity, i.e. roughly half the size in the Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009).
37   
 
By contrast, we do not find any reason to use conservative estimates for mileage. Puigarnau 
and van Ommeren (2009)  do not explore the possibility that fuel and other company car 
subsidies reduces the cost of commuting and may lead to company car owners take residence 
further from the work place. So we stick with the estimates they have. 
Summarising the results 
The overall range of effects used as ball park estimates in this study is summarised in Table 
5.5 below. They are use also to calculate the welfare effects and effects on fuel consumption 
as described in annex B and C. 
 
Table 5.5: Summarising the results  
Current study (EU) 
Impact on: 
Puigarnau and van 
Ommeren (2007),(2009) 
(the Netherlands)  Direct application  Conservative estimate 
Total stock of cars  365,000  20,800,000  8,600,000 
Value of the car  €9,000 –€ 12,000  € 8,200  € 4,100 
Extra kilometres driven per 
year per company car  1,500 1,595 
Source:   Copenhagen Economics 
                                                 
34 Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007), p. 16. 
35 Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007), p. 7. 
36 Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009), p. 10. 
37 Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009), p. 11. 
  46ANNEX B: CALCULATING WELFARE EFFECTS 
 
Using the approach in Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007, 2009) 
 
Figure 5.1: Deadweight loss of a subsidy or illustration of the ‘rule of half’ 
Deadweight 
Loss of 













Source: Copenhagen  Economics 
 
In this section we calculate welfare loss from the subsidy by following the approach outlined 
in Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007, 2009). Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007) calculates 
welfare effects from the application of the subsidy by applying the standard theory. According 
to standard economic theory, the introduction of a subsidy will serve to lower the price paid 
by consumers which will increase output beyond the socially optimal level of production 
determined by market prices without subsidies. The presence of a subsidy means that the 
marginal benefit to consumers of extra cars purchased due to the subsidy are less than the 
society’s cost of producing these cars – hence a welfare loss. To calculate the welfare loss it is 
necessary to estimate the size of the subsidy and the increase in the number of cars that results 
from the subsidy. Welfare loss is then calculated as half of the product of the two quantities 
(hence, studies refer to ‘the rule of the half’).  
Welfare effects from increased car stock 
Welfare loss due to car fixed costs: 
 
•  Average tax advantage to car fixed costs (in €, per car): €2,873 
•  Quantity effect, EU: 
•  using the Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007) approach: 20.8 million cars 
 
Welfare loss due to subsidy to car fixed costs: 
 
½ × €2873 × 20.8 = €29.8 billion 
 
  47The welfare loss due to company cars amounts about 0.2% of the cumulative GDP of the 
countries covered in this study.
38 
 
In comparison, Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007) reports welfare costs in the range of €1.1 
billion or about 0.2% of the Dutch GDP in 2008.  
 
Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) provides new evidence of an affect on the stock of cars 
by noting that households’ total demand for cars increase by €14.000 i.e. in excess of the 
increase of the most expensive car (page 34). This residual increase must by definition be 
linked to a combination of more expensive company cars and an effect of other cars in the 
families, most likely the likelihood of more cars. We rely though on the earlier study from 
(2007) for the effect on the stock of cars. 
Welfare effects from increased car prices 
Following the notation in Puigarnau and van Ommeren we denote the unit price of holding 
one car faced by the household by p. If household i has a company car p is given by p
c where 
p
c is the unit price of the car minus the tax advantage otherwise the price is given by p. When 
a household receive a company car the price change from p to p
c, denoted by  .  
 
To calculate the welfare effect we need an estimate of the change in the household demand 
for car units, Δx, but this size is not observable.  Δx refers to the tax-induced change in 
demand for car units. The Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) study assumes that the change 
in car demand is related to changes in the market value of the car, ΔV. More specific they 
assume that the annual car expenditures, px, is proportional to V, given by px = αV. 
 
The proportionality factor, α, is given by the ration between the annual price of using a car 
and the purchase price of the car.  
 
Given a linear demand function for cars the change in welfare from a change in the tax 
treatments of company cars can be measured by a half times the change in price times the 








Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) estimate that the possession of a company car increases 
the value of the (most expensive) car in the household by about €9,000 to €12,000. In 
assessing the welfare loss per company car they assume that ΔV equals €10,000.  
 
The study sets the proportionality factor to 0.40 (c.f. appendix A in Puigarnau and van 
Ommeren (2009)).  
 
                                                 
38 The cumulative GDP of the countries covered by this study amounted to €12.1 trillion in 2008. 
  48 reflects the income tax advantages given to company cars, where. The tax advantage in 




 denotes the marginal income tax which they set to 52 percent. Based on their estimation the 
Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) study sets this size to 35 percent of the car unit price 
including the VAT tax advantage. 
 




By rewriting the welfare loss we note that the tax advantages in the Puigarnau and van 









We then convert this approach to EU levels, using the study’s price elasticity along with our 
estimates of subsidies and car prices as documented in annex A
39. Here we estimate that the 





There are 17.6 million company cars in EU. Hence the effect on EU level is equal to €3,8 
billion or about 0.03% of GDP. 
Welfare effects from increased travel 
The approach to estimating welfare costs from increased travel in Puigarnau and van 
Ommeren (2009)  is the same as with the other elements. The tax subsidy results from the 
under-taxation of the value of free fuel and that the marginal depreciation from more private 
use of the car is borne by the firm. In Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) these two 
combined provides a subsidy of € 0.15 per kilometre.  
 
                                                 
39 In Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007), the tax advantage is calculated without taking personal income tax into 
account. The difference between the value of the company provided benefit in kind and the imputed value for tax 
purposes amounts to €6100, while our calculations give €5200 for a car of similar price and mileage.  





Given 0.8 million company cars
40 in Netherlands that equals a welfare loss of € 90 million. 
 
This can be scaled up to EU levels.  We have restricted our calculation of the pure subsidy 
part to the direct fuel cost part, hence excluded the inherent subsidy related to the increased 
depreciation costs. Hence the subsidy equals the average price of fuel in EU multiplied by tax 
rate. This quantity effect is equal to the fuel effect per company car of 1,595/divided by fuel 




We scale that up to EU level by multiplying with the number of company cars in the EU, i.e. 
17.6 million; hence we get a welfare loss of € 0.6 billion or about 0.01% of GDP. 
 
This seems an underestimation bearing in mind that we have not included the depreciation 
subsidy as in Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009). 
                        
Table 5.6 summarises the results found in this section.  
 
 
                                                 
40 Calculated as the sum of non-private registrations in 2006, 2007 and 2008 in the Netherlands using Polk 
(2009). 
  50Table 5.6: Summary of welfare effects  
Current study  Puigarnau and van 
Ommeren (2007), 



























 EU: €14.9 
billion 
0.3% of 
GDP*   Total 
€2300*** 
per company 
car    
€1950 per 
company car    
 €848 per 
















car**    
€1694per 
company car    
€ 706 per 
company 
car     
€0.5 billion 
(total)** 





GDP*   €1.9 billion 
0.01% of 
GDP*   From increased 
car prices  €700 per 
company car    
€217 per 
company car    
 €108 per 
company car    








GDP*  From increased 
fuel use  €200 per 
company car    
€35 per 
company car    
€35 per 
company car    
Note: *GDP of the countries covered in this study, excluding France (for which the stock of company cars is not available in the Polk (2009) 
data). Copenhagen Economics estimates exclude effects from the VAT. Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) estimates include effects from 
VAT. 
** Calculated by Copenhagen Economics given 795,000 company cars in the Netherlands as given in Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2007). 
*** Calculated by adding up the effects from increased car stock, increased car prices and increased fuel use. 
Source:   Copenhagen Economics 
 
  51ANNEX C: IMPACT ON FUEL CONSUMPTION AND CO2 EMISSIONS 
 
•  A higher stock of cars leads to more fuels being consumed. A highly simplified approach 
is to scale up consumption with the increase in the stock. A more realistic assumption is to 
assume that the additional car is smaller and driven fewer miles than the primary and more 
expensive company car 
 
•  A more expensive car also uses more fuel per driven kilometre all through its life time, i.e. 
also when it passed over to private owner ship. We use a simple correlation between car 
price and car efficiency to calculate this effect while assuming that the overall share of 
company cars in new sales is the best proxy for the share of the present or former 
company cars in the total car stock 
 
•  We use the direct estimates of more kilometres being driven per company car to evaluate 
the direct effects of fuel subsidies on fuel consumption. 
First effect: more cars 
We estimate that there are about 20.8 million more cars due to the subsidy, or 9 percent larger 
number of cars. Assuming that the extra cars have the same average efficiency and driving 
patterns as the cars in the total stock, fuel consumption is also 9 percent higher as a result of 
these extra cars.  Bearing in mind that the additional car may well be substantially smaller 
than the main car in the household which is typically the company car, we rather arbitrarily 
reduce the effect to one third, also bearing in mind that the second car may be driven less 
intensively than the first. 
 
The Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) study supports this story. It suggests that the total 
value of the cars at the disposal of families with company cars, controlled for income and 
other variables, exceed that of other comparable families with € 14.000 while the most 
expensive car in the family increases by € 10.000. At the same time, such families increase on 
average their stock of cars from roughly 1 1/4 to 1 ¾, very few Dutch families have more than 
two cars.  
So to simplify further, we could essentially suggest that such results are consistent with two 
set of reactions. One half of families may stick to the number of cars they use but splash € 
14.000 more on that car. The second half decides to have one more car and then only spend € 
6.000 more on the most expensive car in the household. That will exactly reproduce the 
numbers of above, on average € 10.000 more on the most expensive car and half a car more. 
The point is then that that the there is only € 8000 money left for the second family to 
purchase that additional car to keep the remaining constraint, namely that total value of cars 
goes up by € 14000 per company car family. As the average car in the Netherlands had a price 
just exceeding € 20.000 in 2006 in our data that would just buy you a car at less than half that 
price. Moreover, it is likely that this secondary car would be driven less, for example 
commuting would be linked to the company car.  That brings us to a ball park estimate of one 
third as referred to above.   
Second effect: more expensive cars 
To calculate extra fuel used as a result of more expensive cars, we use the relationship 
between car segments and their emissions, measured by CO2 emissions per km, given in 
Figure 5.2. The relationship is positive close to linear, meaning that the larger the segment the 
larger the emissions. Because the larger the segment, the more expensive the average price of 
cars in it, we can use this to proxy the extra CO2 emissions from an increase in the price of 
  52cars due to the subsidy which was estimated at €8,200. We find that the increase in emissions 
corresponds to 13.9 g CO2 / km which using standard conversion coefficients can be 
expressed as 0.48 litres per 100 km.  
 
Given that the EU average company car efficiency is 5.9 l / 100 km, the increase due to more 
expensive cars caused by the subsidy corresponds to 8 percent cf. Table 5.7. As roughly half 
of all cars are present or former company cars, we somewhat arbitrarily reduce this effect to 4 
percent. 
 
Figure 5.2: Relationship between car price segments and emissions 
 
Source: Copenhagen  Economics and Polk (2009) 
 
Table 5.7: Effects of fuel consumption from more expensive cars being used 
Step  Amount  Approach  Source 
Calculating increase in C02 




Interpolation between the average price and 
emissions of segment 3 and 4 in the diagram.  Polk (2009) 
Calculating the counterfactual 
price of cars 
23260 
 
Average EU price €30760 – the effect of the 
subsidy, €7500   
Calculating emission level at 
the counterfactual price  156.0 g CO2 / km 
The counterfactual price is close to the price of 
segment 3 (€22822) meaning that linear 
extrapolation will give a good approximation 
of the emission factor. Given that the emission 
factor is 155.22 gCO2 / km for segment 3, 
emission for the counterfactual l is 156.0. 
This study 
Calculating the increase in 
emissions as a result from the 
price change 
156.0 + (0,001751727 
* 7500) = 169.9 
 
169.9 – 156.0 = 13.9 g CO2 
/ km 
Multiplying the factor measuring extra 
emissions per extra 1 € of car value times the 
price increase (€7500) 
This study 
Calculating the increase in fuel 
consumption as a result from 
the price change 
 
 
13.9 g CO2 / km 
corresponds to an increase 
in 0.46 l / 100 km 
Converting g CO2 / km into litres using a 
standard conversion coefficient   This study 
Calculating the effect on extra 
fuel due to more expensive cars  0.48 / 5.9 = 8% 
Given that the average efficiency of the EU car 
fleet is 5.9 l / 100 km, we calculate the increase 
due to more expensive cars 
This study 
Source: Copenhagen  Economics 
Third effect: more km 
The European car fleet drives 28.2 billion extra km as a result of the fuel subsidy to company 
cars as estimated in annex A.  This translates into an increase in fuel consumption of fuel 
  53consumption of 28.2 divided by average fuel efficiency (kilometres per litre) of 17½ which is 
1.7 billion litres.  
Total fuel consumption effects in litres 
Having calculated the three partial effects above, our aim is to aggregate them to arrive at an 
estimate of increase in total fuel consumption due to the three effects (more cars, larger cars 
and more km driven). Our approach is as follows: 
 
We start by calculating the amount of fuel used by passenger cars in the EU. Then, we use the 
results to derive emission of CO2 and particulate matter. 
 
Total energy use by passenger cars in the EU amounted to 175,721 ktoe in 2005, equivalent to 
7,380 PJ (peta joules) of energy. Of this, approximately one-third was from diesel and two-
thirds from gasoline consumption.
41  Using standard conversion coefficients, we convert the 
energy consumption into volumes of diesel and gasoline. We obtain 57 billion litres of diesel 
and 128 billion litres of gasoline, giving a total of 185 billion litres of fuel consumed by 
passenger cars in the EU in 2005. 
 
Our aim is to derive the extra amount of litres of fuel from the effects calculated above, and 
sum them to arrive at the total effect on fuel use from company car subsidies. This effect 
amounts to 14.7 billion litres or 8 percent more fuel use in the direct application scenario, 
while the conservative estimate is 4 percent. 
 
Table 5.8 summarises the result of this section.  
 
Table 5.8: Summarizing the effect on fuel use 
Current study 
Origin of effect 
Direct application  Conservative estimate 
More cars  3% more fuel use, or 5.6 billion litres  1% more fuel use, or 1.9 billion litres 
More expensive cars  4% more fuel use, or 7.4 billion litres  2% more fuel use, or 3.7 billion litres 
More kilometres driven  1% more fuel use or extra 1.7 billion litres of fuel 
Total effect  8% more fuel or extra 14.7 billion litres  4% more fuel or extra 7.3 billion litres 
Source:   Copenhagen Economics 
Calculating effect on emissions of CO2 and particulate emissions 
To calculate the effect on emissions, we convert the extra fuel consumed by company into 
CO2  assuming 3200g CO2 emissions per litre of diesel and 2800g CO2 emissions per litre of 
gasoline as well as a diesel to gasoline ratio of 1 to 2. The weighted average emission 
coefficient thus becomes 2933 g CO2 / l of the fuel mix. In Table 5.9, we show the effect on 
CO2 emissions in the “direct application” and “conservative” cases using the total effects on 
fuel use reported in Table 5.8 
 
For particulate emissions, we use the coefficient of 0.025 g / km.
42 European company cars on 
average require 5.9 l of fuel per 100 km. Therefore, we are able to restate the particulate 
                                                 
41 Cf. Figure 46 and Figure 47 in DG TREN (2007). 
42 NERI (2007), p. 196. We assume that the newly sold diesel company cars fulfil the EURO4 norm for as 
regards particulate, NOx and HC emissions. 
  54emissions coefficient as 0.42 g / l for the European company car fleet
43. Using the coefficient 
and the diesel share (1/3) of the total effects on fuel consumption from Table 5.8, we are able 
to calculate particulate emissions
44. The results are provided in Table 5.9  
 
For NOx emissions, we use the coefficient of 0.25 g / km for diesel and 0.08 g / km for 
petrol
45. We use 5.9 l of fuel per 100 km as average fleet efficiency, and calculate emissions of 
nitrogen oxides resulting from diesel and petrol use, respectively. The results are provided in 
Table 5.9. 
 
Finally, for HC (hydrocarbon) emissions, we use the coefficient of 0.10 g / km.
46 The 
calculation proceeds in an analogous way as before, using petrol fuel only. The results are 
reported in Table 5.9. 
 
Table 5.9: Total effects on emissions of CO2 and particulates 
  Direct application  Conservative estimate 
CO2 (carbon dioxide)  43 Mt  21 Mt 
Particulate emissions  1.9 kt  1.0 kt 
NOx (oxides of nitrogen)  50.6 kt  25.0 kt 
HCs (hydrocarbons)  13.7 kt  6.8 kt 
Note: Mt is metric mega tonnes. kt is metric kilo tonnes. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics and NERI (2007) 
 
                                                 
43 Calculated as 0.025 [g / km] * 100 [km]  / 5.9[ l / 100 km]. 
44 Note that particulate emissions are a feature of diesel company cars. 
45 NERI (2007), p. 196, assuming the EURO4 norm. 
46 NERI (2007), p. 196, assuming the EURO4 norm. 
  55ANNEX D:  FOREGONE TAX REVENUES (FISCAL LOSSES) 
 
In this section we describe our approach to calculate the monetary amount of foregone tax 
revenues. We use Germany and Spain as illustrations. 
 
Our approach is to calculate the ‘too small tax base’, i.e. the difference between the value of 
the benefit-in-kind received and the taxable base on that benefit. To calculate the former we 
use the assumptions given in Annex E, while the latter is found from the application of the 
rules governing the taxation of company cars received as part of employees’ private income. 
The ‘too small tax base’ is essentially equivalent to the before-tax monetary subsidy, i.e. it 
represents the part of the before-tax income received by the employee from the firm in the 
form of a company car that escapes personal income taxation.  
 
Too small employee tax base, per car, € = annualised firm cost, per car, € - annualised 
employee tax base, per car, € 
 
To calculate the foregone tax, we multiply the ‘too small tax base’ by the applicable personal 
income tax wedge. This gives the monetary amount of foregone taxes, per company car, or 
alternatively the after-tax subsidy to the recipient of the benefit-in-kind. 
 
Foregone tax, per car, € = too small tax base, € × tax wedge 
 
Finally, we multiply the above amount by the number of cars to arrive at the total amount of 
foregone tax revenues from the tax collector’s point of view. 
 
Foregone tax, total, € = foregone tax, per car, € × number of cars 
 
We carry out the above calculation for each of the six car segments identified in the Polk data 
using data from 2008. Moreover, since our subsidy calculations are based on two assumptions 
concerning the mileage (low and high, cf. Annex E), we calculate two estimates of foregone 
tax revenues per car segment. 
 
Table 5.10 presents the results for Germany. Our estimate of foregone revenues ranges from € 
21.0 billion in the low mileage case to € 24.8 billion in the high mileage case. Assuming that 
true mileage is in-between the low and high estimates, this amounts to €22.9 billion in lost tax 
revenue in 2008.   
 
These numbers can be broadly verified by some back-of-the-envelope calculations. The total 
value cars sold for company cars per year in Germany approach €53 billion according to Polk 
data on registrations and prices for these cars. We assume that these cars remain as company 
cars for roughly 3 years and kept in good condition per high level of maintenance thus given a 
value of the company car stock of over €150 billion.  Our estimates suggest that the users of 
these cars should face an increase of their tax base of 35-40 per cent of this sum to cover the 
yearly costs of depreciation, interest charges and maintenance of these cars. Yet, the rate for 
imputation is only 12 per cent. Hence, the taxable base is roughly €38 billion too low. In 
addition to that comes company-provided “free” and untaxed fuel for private use which may 
be worth between €5 and €11 billion, depending on assumptions on mileage. So in total, the 
  56tax base is €43 to 50 billion too low, relative to a neutral benchmark. With a marginal tax rate 
around 50 per cent on average, that gives the approximately €23 billion in tax losses. 
 
Table 5.10: Foregone tax revenues in Germany 
Segment  Mini  Small  LowMed  Medium  UpMed  Large  
Private usage  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High 
Number of company 
cars (thousand)  279  279  938  938  2045  2045  1555  1555  663  663  82  82 
Too little tax base, 
per car  
(€ thousand)  3.1  4.0  3.9  4.9  5.6  6.7  7.7  9.0  11.9  13.4  17.6  19.4 
Tax wedge (%)  55.7  55.7  55.7  55.7  61.2  61.2  61.2  61.2  44.3  44.3  44.3  44.3 
Foregone tax 
revenues  
(€ billion)  0.48  0.62  2.0  2.63  7.0  8.4  7.4  8.6  3.5  3.9  0.64  0.71 
Foregone revenues: low mileage:   21.0 € billion               
Foregone revenues high mileage:  24.8 € billion               
Average:                                             22.9 € billion               
Source: Copenhagen Economics, Polk (2009) and OECD (2009) 
 
Repeating the same exercise for Spain gives the following results: € 3.7 billion foregone tax 
revenue in the low mileage case, € 4.4 billion revenue in the high mileage case, amounting to 
€ 4.1 billion in the in-between case.  
 
Table 5.11: Foregone tax revenues in Spain 
Segment  Mini  Small  LowMed  Medium  UpMed  Large  
Private usage  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High 
Number of company 
cars (thousand)  88  88  493  493  743  743  365  365  150  150  11  11 
Too little tax base, 
per car 
(€ thousand)  2.4  3.1  3,0  3.7  4.2  5.0  5.6  6.6  8.8  10.1  14.1  15.6 
Tax wedge (%)  48,2  48,2  48,2  48,2  48,2  48,2  48,2  48,2  28,0  28,0  28,0  28,0 
Foregone tax 
revenues  
(€ billion)  0.10  0.13  0.70  0.89  1.49  1.80  0.98  1.15  0.37  0.42  0.04  0.05 
Foregone revenues: low mileage:   € 3.7 billion               
Foregone revenues high mileage:   € 4.4 billion               
Average:                                              € 4.1 billion               
Source: Copenhagen Economics, Polk (2009) and OECD (2009) 
 
Using the above approach we calculate foregone tax revenues in each of the 18EU member 
states and express them as a percentage of their GDP. We find that the foregone tax revenues 
amount to about 0.5 percent of GDP, on average, cf. Table 5.12 
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Groups  Country  Imputed tax rate  Marginal tax rate 
Company car 
share (of GDP), 
2008 
Loss, share of GDP 
(%) 
0-15 percent  Greece  0%  52%  0,6%  0,3% 
  Portugal  9%  54%  1,5%  0,5% 
  Czech Republic  12%  52%  0,7%  0,3% 
  Germany  12%  56%  2,1%  0,9% 
  Slovakia  12%  43%  0,7%  0,1% 
  Weighted average  11%  56%  1,9%  0,8% 
15-24 percent  Sweden  9%+extras  65%  1,1%  0,3% 
  Finland   17%  58%  1,1%  0,2% 
  Austria  18%  57%  1,6%  0,6% 
  Luxembourg  18%  54%  2,1%  0,6% 
  Slovenia  18%  48%  2,1%  0,6% 
  Spain  20%  45%  1,1%  0,4% 
  Weighted average  16%*  52%  1,2%  0,4% 
Above 24 percent  Denmark  25%  61%  1,1%  0,2% 
  Netherlands  25%  52%  1,3%  0,2% 
  United Kingdom  25%  47%  1,4%  0,4% 
  Italy  30%  64%  1,1%  0,5% 
  Weighted average  27%  55%  1,3%  0,3% 
n.a.  Belgium  n.a.  68%  2,0%  1,2% 
  Hungary  n.a.  65%  1,1%  0,8% 
  Poland  n.a.  45%  0,7%  0,0% 
  Weighted average  n.a.  58%  1,3%  0,6% 
  Total weighted average  18%*  55%  1,4%  0,5% 
Note:  In the weighted average for each group, the share of total GDP within the group is used as a weight. In the total weighted average, 
the share of total GDP (of the 18 countries) is used as a weight. France is not included. The loss as share of GDP for Poland is set to zero. * 
Sweden is not included in the calculated weighted average. The marginal tax rate for each country is an average weighted by the value of 
company cars in the 6 segments. 
Source: Copenhagen  Economics 
Calculating the neutral imputation rate 
The presence of fiscal loss implies that the currently used imputation rates are too low relative 
to the value of the benefit-in-kind provided by firms to employees. Knowing the latter, it is 
straightforward to calculate the size of the imputation rate that would equate the neutral 
personal income tax base. In what follows, we carry out a calculation of the neutral 
imputation rate using the example of a middle segment company car in Germany. We find 
that the imputation rate is in the order of 50 percent of car list price per annum, which is 38 
percentage points more than the currently applied rate of 12 percent, cf. Table 5.13. This 
result is consistent with calculations performed by Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) for 
the Netherlands, and reproduced in Table 5.14. They obtain essentially the same neutral 
imputation rate of 50 percent, which is substantially higher than the 22 percent rate currently 
used in the Netherlands. 
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Item  Monetary values 
actual, € 
Actual tax rate, %
Neutral tax rate, 
% 
Car list price, actual  35314     
Value of company-provided benefits     
Car value, annualised  11474     
Fuel cost, annualised  2159     
ITM, annualised  4316     
Total benefit, annualised  17949     
Value of employee tax base     
Car value, annualised  4382  12% of car list price  32% of car list price 
Fuel cost, annualised  0  0%  6% of car list price 
ITM cost, annualised  0  0%  12% of car list price 
Total employee tax base  4382  12% of car list price  51% of car list 
price* 
Note: The results are rounded off to whole figures 
Source: Copenhagen  Economics 
 
The Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) distinguish between 2 types of company cars: 
 
•  Productive cars – used for private and business purposes by employees 
•  Non-productive cars – used solely for private purposes by employees 
 
Productive cars are more expensive to buy. However, in the Netherlands most company cars 
are used for private purposes, so they are non-productive.
47 The study identifies the following 
cost components. They are essentially the same as the assumptions in the current study: 
 
•  Fixed costs: purchase cost (derived from lease cost), insurance, maintenance, road tax 
•  Variable costs: fuel costs and depreciation cost per km 
 
Table 5.14 shows the calculation from the study using the setup developed for Germany, 
above (for comparison).  
 
Table 5.14 Actual tax base and neutral tax base example, Netherlands, non-productive car 
Item  Monetary values 
actual, € 
Actual tax rate, %
Neutral tax rate, 
% 
Car list price, actual  17000     
Value of company-provided benefits     
Car value, annualised  3700     
Fuel cost, annualised  2550     
ITM, annualised  2500     
Total benefit, annualised 8750     
Value of employee tax base     
Car value, annualised  4080  24% of car list price  22% 
Fuel cost, annualised  0  0%  15% 
ITM cost, annualised  0  0%  15% 
Total employee tax base    24% of car list price  51% of car list 
price* 
Note: The results are rounded off to whole figures. Note paper uses an actual imputation rate of 22% which recently has been changed to 24%.  
Source: Copenhagen Economics, Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) p. 9 and Appendix A. 
                                                 
47 Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) p. 3. In the Netherlands, 78% of employees with company car have NOT used this car for any 
business purpose during a period of 3 months, and another 12% have travelled less than 100km per week for business purposes.  
 
  59ANNEX E: CALCULATING THE SUBSIDY TO PRIVATE USE OF COMPANY CARS IN FRANCE 
 
In this annex we use the French tax rules to illustrate a calculation of the subsidy received by 
employee using a company-provided car for private purpose. France provides two methods of 
calculating the tax: based on actual use and lump-sum. We assume that the employee can 
choose the most advantageous method given the intensity of private use. In this example, the 
employee drives 10,000 km p.a. while the business use of the car is 25,000 km p.a. which 
makes the lump-sum method most advantageous.  
 
The full methodology together with documentation is available in Part B to this study. 
 
To calculate the subsidy we use the company cost perspective. We start by calculating the net 
present value of the cost to the company of providing the employee with the car, which 
includes the acquisition cost of the vehicle, the cost of the fuel provided to the employee for 
private use and other costs incurred by the company, such as maintenance, repair, motoring 
taxes or parking fees. The calculation is based on assumptions illustrated below. The next step 
is to calculate the net present value of the increase in the tax base for the employee using the 
company-provided car, fuel and the remaining benefits (maintenance, repairs, parking, etc.). 
The calculation is also based on assumptions listed below. 
 
Once the two net present values are found, we convert them to annual equivalents and 
compare the difference between them to the acquisition cost of the car which under French 
rules is also taxable for the employee. The amount is presented as percentage. 
Calculation of company cost 
Assumptions: 
r:  Segment list price reduced by 15% (company buying advantage) 
Insurance, maintenance, running costs, p.a.:  12% of acquisition cost  
Employee private use:   10,000 km p.a. 
Business use:      25,000 km p.a. 
Derived from average segment emissions, g CO2 / km (Polk data) 
Fuel price:      National annual average in 2008, 1.38 €/l 
Depreciation over 3 years:    61% 
Company cost of capital:    4.34% 
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Company cash flows 
 
Source:   Copenhagen Economics 
 
Company costs of providing the benefit-in-kind in France 
Cost item  Year 0  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3 
Car purchase  -€32.516       
Fuel costs    -€761  -€761  -€761 
ITM (insurance, maintenance, taxes,)    - €3.902  - €3.902  - €3.902 
Car sale (residual value in year 3)        €10.779 
Net present value (NPV)  -€31.005       
Equivalent annual cost (EAC)  -€11.245       
Source:   Copenhagen Economics 




According to the French lump sum method, the employee tax base is calculated as the sum of 
the three components below:  
 
•  Tax base from the value of the car: declarable, 12% of company acquisition cost of the 
vehicle 
•  Tax base from fuel use provided by the employer: not declarable  
•  Tax base from having received paid insurance, taxes and other services: declarable in full 
 
multiplied by the ratio of private to business miles 10,000/25,000  or 0.4. 
Assumptions: 
Employee private mileage:    10,000 km p.a. 
Employee business mileage    25.000 km p.a. 
Employee real discount cost:   8.63% 
 
  61Employee cash flows 
- €7.200                 - €7.200                - €7.200 













- €7.200                 - €7.200                - €7.200 














Source:   Copenhagen Economics 
 
 
Calculation of employee tax base 
Cost item  Year 0  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3 
Tax base: from car value, lump-sum method    €€3.317  €3.317  €3.317 
Tax base: from use of fuel provided by employer    €0  €0  €0 
Tax base: from use of ITM provided by employer    €3.902  €3.902  €3.902 
Net present value  €18.393       
Equivalent annual cost  €7.218       
Source:   Copenhagen Economics 
Calculation of subsidy 
To calculate the subsidy, we subtract the tax base declarable by the employee from the 
company cost of providing the benefit-in-kind and express this difference relative to the 
acquisition cost of the car. 
 
Equivalent annual cost for company:   -€11.245 
Equivalent annual cost for employee:   €7,218 
Car  acquisition  cost:     €32,516 
 
Subsidy = (|-€11.245| – €7,218 × 0.4) / €32,516 = 30% 
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